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I. INTRODUCTION
A. In General
Partners are liable for their own acts, while partnerships are gen-
erally liable for the acts of their partners and other agents and em-
ployees.1 It is common knowledge that partners are in turn liable for
partnership obligations arising from the acts of partners, agents and
employees. Moreover, this is full personal liability, so that any part-
ner is theoretically liable for the entire amount of the partnership ob-
ligation. However, this burden may be lightened in two ways. First, in
many instances exhaustion of partnership assets or partnership insol-
vency is required before a partner's personal assets can be reached.
Second, indemnification or contribution rights within the partnership
1. ALAN R. BROMBERG & LARRY E. RIBSTEIN, BROMBERG & RIBSTEIN ON PARTNER-
SNIP (1988)[hereinafter BROMBERG & RiBSTEIN].
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or among the partners2 may reimburse the partner for any dispropor-
tionate satisfaction of partnership obligations from the partner's per-
sonal assets. However, indemnification and contribution do not
reduce a partner's liability to third parties. Despite these reliefs, per-
sonal liability is probably the greatest drawback of the general part-
nership form of business and the reason most commonly assigned for
using other forms of organization.
As one court wrote after noting the individual liability of partners:
"[lIt is a different and more serious matter to be directly within the
power of a court to order immediate attachment of one's property."3
How one or more partners and the partnership come within the power
of a court and how their personal liability can be enforced are the sub-
jects of this Article. The answers are far from simple. Particular
questions include: Who must or may be sued: partners (all or some)
or the partnership? Who must or may be served with process: part-
ners (all or some) or the partnership or agent? Against whom may
judgment be entered: partners (all or some) or the partnership?
Against whose property may judgment be executed: partners' (all or
some) or the partnership's? Against whom may the judgment debt be
enforced by supplementary proceeding or separate suit: partners (all
or some) or the partnership? Must partnership assets be exhausted
before partners' individual assets are applied?
The enforcement of partnership obligations is the least uniform-
and most confusing--of all aspects of American partnership law. It is
fragmented by a major division within the Uniform Partnership Act
("U.P.A"), variations of the U.P.A. in the adopting states, and diverse
procedural overlays. We will examine the three principal methods,
defined by the styles of the suits, that might be used to enforce part-
nership obligations:
(1) An action against all the partners in their own names: P v. A, B
& C (doing business as, or as partners of, ABCPartnership). This suit
is discussed in Part II below.
(2) An action against fewer than all the partners in their own
names: P v. A or P v. A & B (doing business as, or as partners of, ABC
Partnership). This suit is considered in Part III (for most contract
cases) and Part IV (for tort, trust breach and some contract cases)
below.
(3) An action against the partnership in its own name: P v. ABC
Partnership. This suit is considered in Part V below.
The structure of these Parts generally parallels that of a previous
2. UNa'. PARTNERsHinp ACr §§ 18(b), 40(a)(H), 40(d), 6 U.L.A. 1, 213, 469 (1969); 2
BROMBERG & RmsTEIN, supra note 1, § 6.02(f).
3. First Nat'l Bank of Minneapolis v. White, 420 F.Supp. 1331, 1336 (D. Minn. 1976).
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article4 which dealt with the converse problems of enforcement of
partnership rights. The principles discussed in this Article apply to
judicial actions and generally to nonjudicial actions such as arbitra-
tions and administrative proceedings in which partner or partnership
defendants raise the kind of questions discussed here (e.g., by motion
to dismiss or for summary judgment, for failure to state a claim or for
lack of jurisdiction).
Obviously, before a person can be held liable as a partner, he or she
must be pled and proved to be a partner.5 Limited partners are gener-
ally not liable at all for partnership obligations.6 The discussion in
this Article applies to general partnerships and to general (but not
usually to limited) partners in limited partnerships since general part-
ners in limited partnerships have the same liabilities as general part-
ners in general partnerships.7 However, limited partners, even
though not generally suable on partnership obligations, are of particu-
lar importance in determining whether their partnerships can be sued
in federal court. This issue is examined in the separate treatment of
federal court partnership litigation in Part VI below. A critique of the
whole untidy area of enforcement of partnership obligations appears
in Part VII.
B. Joint v. Joint and Several
The U.P.A. draws a sharp distinction between two kinds of part-
ner liability. Under U.P.A. section 15(a) partners are jointly and sev-
erally liable "for everything chargeable to the partnership under"
U.P.A. sections 13 (wrongful acts, e.g., torts) and 14 (breaches of trust).
Under U.P.A. section 15(b) partners are jointly liable "for all other
debts and obligations (e.g., contracts) of the partnership."8
In joint liability, all the joint parties (partners) must be sued9 with
4. Alan R. Bromberg, Enforcement of Partnership Right-WiM Sues for the Part-
nership?, 70 NEB. L. REv. 1 (1991).
5. Gorton v. Fellner, 451 N.Y.S.2d 873 (App. Div. 1982)(no liability of ex partner for
tort committed after his withdrawal from partnership); Fanelli v. Adler, 516
N.Y.S.2d 716 (App. Div. 1987)(fact question whether defendant was a partner at
time of alleged copartner's tort bars summary judgment for defendant); Texaco,
Inc. v. Wolfe, 601 S.W.2d 737,742 (Tex. Civ. App. 1980)(suit against partners with-
out naming partnership or alleging that they were partners insufficient for judg-
ment against partner for obligation created by copartner).
6. UNIF. LTD. PARTNERSHIP AcT § 7, 6 U.L.A. 1, 582 (1969); REV. UNIF. LTD. PART-
NERSHIP AcT § 303, 6 U.L.A. 239, 325-26 (1976 & Supp. 1991)(amended 1985).
7. UNrF. LTD. PARTNERsHip Acr § 9(1), 6 U.L.A. 559, 586 (1969); REV. UNIF. LTD.
PARTNERSHIP AcT § 403(b), 6 U.L.A. 239, 345 (1976 & Supp. 1991)(amended 1985).
8. Historical development of these two concepts of partner liability in law and in
equity and in England and in America is described in Francis M. Burdick, Joint
and Several Liability of Partners, 11 COLUM. L. REv. 101 (1911).
9. See infra section II.C.
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a number of exceptions discussed in Part III below.1O In joint and sev-
eral liability, all the parties may be sued together, or, as discussed in
Part IV, any one or more may be sued separately or together.". Vari-
ous consequences flow from these differences. These include exhaus-
tion of partnership assets before partners' individual assets are
reached (generally required in joint liability and not in joint and sev-
eral liability)' 2 and whether a judgment against one partner extin-
guishes claims against the other partners; sometimes phrased as
whether the claim merges into the judgment (applied in joint liability
[unless otherwise modified] but not in joint and several liability).'3
The U.P.A. drafters gave no policy reason for codifying the distinc-
tion between "joint" and "joint and several." The distinction is all the
more surprising in that the drafters noted that about half the states
had, by statute or otherwise, achieved the equivalent of joint and sev-
eral liability for all partnership obligations. However, the drafters dis-
missed this as procedural, not affecting "substantive law," and
concluded that a state making all partner liability joint and several in
adopting the U.P.A. would not affect the Act's uniformity of substan-
tive law.' 4 In more modem times, we tend to think that the nature of
liability is at least as much substantive as procedural. Be that as it
may, a number of states have made all liability joint and several as
noted in Part III below.' 5
The usual result contemplated by U.P.A. section 15 is that all part-
ners must be sued on contract since a partnership contract is typically
regarded as a joint obligation of the partners.16 But there are impor-
tant and numerous exceptions in the form of local modifications of
U.P.A. section 15 and other statutes or procedural rules for joint obli-
gors,' 7 and for suits in the firm name.' 8
In contrast, any or all the partners may be sued on tort or breach of
trust since that liability is always joint and several by U.P.A. section
15.19
The contract-tort difference is dramatically illustrated by a case in-
volving both kinds of claims arising out of the same conduct, such as
breach of a professional contract and malpractice. The contract claim
against fewer than all the partners may have to be dismissed while the
10. E.g., Mason v. Eldred, 73 U.S. 231 (1868).
11. I&
12. See infra sections LD-F.
13. See infra sections M.B, IV.E-F, and V.E-F.
14. UNI. PARTNEasHIP ACr § 15 official cmt., 6 U.L.A. 1, 174-75 official cmt. (1969).
15. See infra section MI.C.
16. See infra Part I.
17. See infra section III.C.
18. See infra Part V.
19. See infra Part IV.
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tort claim proceeds. 20 Whether a claim is for contract or tort may, of
course, be a matter of dispute.21
Joint liability, if not modified by statutes or procedural rules, has
advantages for the partners. They may be able to avoid personal lia-
bility altogether if the plaintiff cannot manage to join them all prop-
erly. If the partners are all joined they can coordinate their defense,
sharing defense costs and adjudged liabilities, or they can assure that
they will be reimbursed from partnership assets as fully as possible.
Joint liability imposes costs on a third party who enforces a claim
against the partnership. He or she must identify, sue, serve and prose-
cute the case against all the partners. However, because joint liability
is essentially confined to contracts, it is easily contracted around,
although at some cost.
Proposed Revised U.P.A. section 306 would make liability joint and
several for all debts and obligations of the partnership; joint liability
of partners would then vanish from the scene. 22
C. Entity and Aggregate Theories
The differences between joint and joint and several liability are
historical. They do not derive from another fundamental divergence:
the differing theories of a partnership as an entity (a legal personality
separate from the individual partners) or as an aggregate (a group of
individuals).23 Both joint and joint and several partner liability are
inconsistent in some degree with the entity theory. Entity theory
would preclude any liability of a partner for partnership obligations,
just as entity theory precludes shareholder liability for corporate obli-
gations. The closest accommodation to entity theory would be that the
partners are guarantors or sureties of partnership obligations. Joint
and several liability is consistent with aggregate theory. Joint liability
is hard to reconcile with aggregate theory unless aggregate theory con-
ceives of the partnership not merely as a collection of individuals, but
as an inseparable collection. The partnership may be sued in its firm
name, usually with one or more of the partners, on any kind of claim
(e.g., contract or tort) where a statute or procedural rule so permits.
20. See Cunard Line Ltd. v. Abney, 540 F.Supp. 657 (S.D. N.Y. 1982)(design and in-
stallation of a computer system; N.Y. law).
21. See Salem v. Siegel, 126 N.Y.S.2d 214 (Sup. Ct. 1953)(failure to remit proceeds of
property left with partnership for sale held contract, not tort [wrongful use of
proceeds] claim, so joint liability rules applied to bar suit against second partner
after judgment entered against first partner); Bank of Commerce v. DeSantis, 451
N.Y.S.2d 974, 977 (Civ. Ct. 1982)(overdraft of partnership bank account for per-
sonal purposes regarded as governed by deposit agreement with bank, not as
wrongful act).
22. REv. UNIF. PARTNERSHIP Acr § 306 (Discussion Draft 1992).
23. Entity and aggregate theories are discussed in 1 BROMBERG & RIBsTEIN, supra
note 1, § 1.03.
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This is obviously consistent with entity theory, and inconsistent with
aggregate theory.
D. Exhaustion of Partnership Assets Before Recourse to Partners' Assets
Cutting across all the possible methods of enforcing partnership
obligations against partners is the question whether partnership assets
must be exhausted before reaching partners' individual assets. The
answer turns primarily on the nature of the partners' liability. Joint
liability generally requires exhaustion while joint and several does
not.
An exhaustion requirement is consistent with the entity theory of
partnership and inconsistent with aggregate theory.
Exhaustion is a valuable feature for partners and a partial insula-
tion against individual liability. The partners' liability is deferred
pending an unsatisfied judgment against the partnership or a determi-
nation of partnership insolvency. Depending upon whether the court
awards interest and at what rate, the partners probably gain some
time value from this delay. Perhaps most importantly, the exhaustion
rule eliminates-to the extent of partnership assets-the possibility
that one partner will have to pay a disproportionate part of the part-
nership obligation. To that extent, and perhaps altogether, partners
will be spared the cost and delay of having to seek indemnification or
contribution from the partnership or their copartners. 24 Claims
against the partnership can typically be settled by the partnership or
partners for somewhat less if exhaustion prevails. The partners may
therefore be more willing to have the partnership engage in risky ac-
tivities. There is, inevitably, a cost to the partnership and the partners
associated with exhaustion. Credit may be less readily available to the
partnership, or more costly. To obtain partnership credit, the partner-
ship may have to provide collateral or credit enhancement that would
otherwise not be needed, and partners may be required to waive ex-
haustion or give individual guarantees. Contracting costs are associ-
ated with each of these.
Persons seeking to enforce a partnership obligation face the con-
verse of the aspects just noted. The exhaustion rule imposes costs and
burdens on them. They must obtain an unsatisfied judgment against
the partnership or gather sufficient information to show that the part-
nership is insolvent. This is particularly difficult if the partnership
cannot be sued in the partnership name, and unmodified joint liability
requires that all the partners be sued. Alternatively, the claimants
must incur the expense of contracting for joint and several liability,
guarantees, collateral or other assurances of payment, hence, their
24. UNiF. PARTNERSHIP Acr §§ 18(b), 40(a)(II), 40(d), 6 U.L.A. 1, 213, 469 (1969); 2
BROMBERG & RIBsTEIN, supra note 1, § 6.02(f).
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claims typically have somewhat less settlement value. These costs
may be unexpected if the persons dealing with the partnership are
unaware of the exhaustion rule.
Expectation and/or reliance may point either way. Exhaustion is
not supported if third persons expect and rely significantly on the
credit of the individual partners. Exhaustion is supported if third per-
sons contracting with the partnership expect and rely solely or pri-
marily on the credit of the partnership.25
If it were demonstrated that the benefit to third persons from per-
sonal liability of partners was small relative to the costs of enforcing
that liability, or compared to the benefits to partners or partnerships
from reducing or eliminating that liability, there would be strong sup-
port for the exhaustion rule.
The cost to partners of apportioning (e.g., by indemnification or
contribution 26) any liabilities they have to pay personally is probably
lower than the cost to third parties of complying with the exhaustion
requirement.27 From this perspective the exhaustion rule is not effi-
cient. The exhaustion rule is efficient in one respect: it can be easily
contracted around at a cost which may be relatively low (e.g., if simple
guarantee forms are used). However, there is rarely a way to contract
around exhaustion in tort cases and it does not provide efficiency
there. Equitable considerations plus the lack of efficiency make the
exhaustion rule even less justified for torts. This may explain why the
exhaustion rule is generally not applied in joint and several liability
cases which include torts.28
Federal courts generally apply state law in requiring29 or not re-
quiring exhaustion.3 0
The applicable law is considered separately below for joint liability
25. It has been stated as a corollary that the partners have a right to insist that part-
nership property be first exhausted. Cf. Martinez v. Koelling, 228 Neb. 1, 2-4, 421
N.W.2d 1, 2-4 (1988).
26. UNIF. PARTNERsHIP AcT §§ 18(b), 40(a)(II), 40(d), 6 U.L.A. 1, 213, 469 (1969); 2
BROMBERG & RIBSTEIN, supra note 1, § 6.02(f).
27. Cf. Bank of Commerce v. DeSantis, 451 N.Y.S.2d 974, 980 (Civ. Ct. 1982)(partner
granted judgment against copartner for bank's chargeback against partner's indi-
vidual account because of copartner's wrongful overdraft of partnership bank ac-
count); Rubin, P.C. v. A. C. Kluger & Co., 383 N.Y.S.2d 828 (Civ. Ct. 1976)(if
named and served partners are required to pay judgment against partnership,
they may apply for indemnity judgment against partnership and contribution
judgment against copartners they named and served in cross claim). But see Col-
ligan v. Caprio, 252 N.Y.S.2d 571 (D. Ct. 1964)(partner against whom judgment
was entered on partnership claim may not proceed against copartners for contri-
bution without an equity action, (i.e. an accounting)).
28. See infra section I.F.
29. See, e.g., Murphy v. Gutfreund, 624 F. Supp. 444, 448 (S.D. N.Y. 1985)(N.Y. law);
Wisnouse v. Telsey, 367 F.Supp. 855, 858-59 (S.D. N.Y. 1973)(N.Y. law).
30. See, e.g., Foster v. Daon Corp., 713 F.2d 149, 151 (5th Cir. 1983)(Tex. law).
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cases, joint and several liability cases, and suits in partnership name
cases.
E. Exhaustion in Joint Liability
Where partner liability for partnership obligations is joint, as dis-
cussed in Parts H and III below, the virtually unanimous rule is that
partnership assets must be exhausted or the partnership shown to be
insolvent, before partnership creditors can reach partners' individual
assets to enforce their liability. This is true where all partners are
sued,31 where fewer than all partners are sued pursuant to a statute or
procedural rule that overrides the common law requirement that they
all be sued 32 (such as a joint obligor statute),3 3 and where there is no
statute or procedural rule of that kind.34 Where fewer than all the
partners can be sued, their liability is effectively joint and several.
But courts in these cases do not consider the rationale (discussed in
section F below) that dispenses with exhaustion when liability is joint
and several. The exhaustion rule is most fully developed in New
York.35
Deviations from the exhaustion rule in joint liability situations are
rare.
36
31. In re Peck, 99 N.E. 258 (N.Y. Ct. App. 1912). See Seligman v. Friedlander, 92 N.E.
1047 (N.Y. Ct. App. 1910)(construing common law to this effect as unchanged by
an 1897 limited partnership statute); Grogan v. Herrington, 54 S.E.2d 284,287 (Ga.
Ct. App. 1949)(partners may insist on exhaustion; sets aside judgment against one
partner when no judgment was entered against partnership); Gordon v. Texas
Co., 109 A. 368, 369 (Me. 1920) (states that law is well settled that individual assets
are held for payment of partnership debts if partnership assets are insufficient;
holds that partner's properly scheduled liability for partnership debt was dis-
charged in his bankruptcy); Lidberg v. United States, 375 F.Supp. 631, 633 (D.
Minn. 1974)(dictum: exhaustion is "apparently" law in Minnesota); McInnish v.
Continental Oil Co., 362 P.2d 969, 970 (Okla. 1961); Commonwealth Capital Inv.
Corp., v. McElmurry, 302 N.W.2d 222, 225 (Mich. Ct. App. 1980) requires exhaus-
tion although judgment was apparently entered against only one of the partners
sued. See infra section I.E. (discussing where all partners are sued).
32. Diamond Nat'l Corp. v. Thunderbird Hotel, Inc., 454 P.2d 13, 15 (Nev. 1969); Stan-
field Constr. Co. v. Stearns Corp. of Nevada, 6 B.R. 265, 267 (Bankr. D. Nev.
1980)(Nev. law). See In re Peck, 99 N.E. 258 (N.Y. Ct. App. 1912)(pre U.P.A. tort
case). See infra section HI.B.
33. Wisnouse v. Telsey, 367 F.Supp. 855, 858-60 (S.D. N.Y. 1973)(N.Y. law); Rubin,
P.C. v. A. C. Kluger & Co., 383 N.Y.S.2d 828, 831 (Civ. Ct. 1976). See infra section
Ifl.C.
34. Moseley, Hallgarten, Estabrook & Weeden, Inc. v. Ellis, 849 F.2d 264,271 (7th Cir.
1988)(Ill. law). See McCune & McCune v Mountain Bell Tel., 758 P.2d 914, 917
(Utah 1988)("common law requires that the partnership's assets be resorted to
and exhausted before partnership creditors can reach the partners' individual as-
sets"). See infra section HI.B.
35. See intfra section IILC.
36. Gilbert Switzer & Assoc. v. National Hous. Partnership, Ltd., 641 F.Supp. 150,
154-57 (D. Conn. 1986)(Conn. law; granting summary judgment to a partnership
NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW
The exhaustion requirement is not explicit in the U.P.A. It has
been seen as suggested by U.P.A. section 18(a) which allows partners
to share in the surplus after all liabilities are satisfied. It has also been
seen as having been suggested by three provisions which apply after
dissolution: (i) U.P.A. section 40(a) which separately lists the partner-
ship assets as partnership property and partner contributions to pay
liabilities;37 (ii) section 40(c) which requires partnership property to
be applied first to pay creditors before partners are called on to con-
tribute; and (iii) section 40(d) which requires partners to contribute
the amount necessary to satisfy liabilities. These sections are dis-
cussed in Part III below. The exhaustion requirement is an imple-
mentation of the "partners' equities" right to have partnership assets
applied to pay partnership obligations.38
The exhaustion requirement, in modified39 form, prevails by stat-
ute as part of federal bankruptcy law. In a liquidation bankruptcy4
(as opposed to a reorganization bankruptcy4') the trustee (who repre-
sents partnership creditors) must, in effect, exhaust partnership assets
before proceeding against nonbankrupt partners (ie. those who are
not debtors in a Bankruptcy Code case). 42 The trustee is given a claim
creditor against a partner objecting that partnership assets must first be ex-
hausted) citing Robinson v. Security Co., 87 A. 879, 884-85 (Conn. 1913)(as stating
that the state does not require exhaustion; Robinson so states but holds only that
creditors of insolvent partnership may share their remaining claims [after appli-
cation of partnership assets] ratably with creditors of insolvent partners); Stern-
berg Dredging Co. v. Estate of Sternberg, 140 N.E.2d 125, 128 (I1. 1957)(stating
that exhaustion not previously required in equity and UNIF. PARTNERHIP Acr
§ 15, 6 U.L.A. 174 (1969) made no change; it holds that a separate action can be
brought against a dead partner's estate and [by implication] collected from the
estate without exhaustion of partnership assets). See In re Elsub Corp., 66 B.R.
172 (Bankr. D. N.J. 1986)(N.J. and federal law; partner's obligation for partner-
ship debts is not contingent as to liability; hence partnership debts are counted in
determining whether there are fewer than 12 holders of non contingent claims
against the partner so that a single creditor can file an involuntary petition
against the partner under Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C. § 303(b)(3)(1988)).
37. Lenkin v. Beckman, 575 A.2d 273, 277 (D.C. Ct. App. 1990)(dictum).
38. E.g., Casey v. Grantham, 79 S.E.2d 735, 738 (N.C. 1954). Partners' equities are dis-
cussed in 1 BROMBERG & RIBSTEIN, supra note 1, § 3.05(c)(2).
39. Only allowed claims are considered in determining whether there is a deficiency
in partnership assets (i.e., whether they have been exhausted). Allowance of
claims is governed by the Bankruptcy Code 11 U.S.C. § 502 (1988).
40. 1& §§ 701-766.
41. Id. § 103(b); M. Bank Corpus Christi v. Seikel (In re 1-37 Gulf Ltd. Partnership),
48 B.R. 647, 649-50 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 1985). See In re Monetary Group, 55 B.R.
297, 298-99 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1985)(11 U.S.C. §§ 723(a),(b) right of trustee to in-
demnification by general partners when partnership assets are insufficient is not
available in Chapter 11 (reorganization) bankruptcy even though debtor partner-
ship is liquidating).
42. "If there is a deficiency of property of the [partnership] estate to pay in full all
claims which are allowed in a case under this chapter concerning a partnership
and with respect to which a general partner of the partnership is personally ha-
[Vol. 71:143
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against each nonbankrupt partner for the full amount of the defi-
ciency in partnership assets.4 3 The deficiency is the amount of al-
lowed claims against the partnership remaining after applying all
partnership assets.44 The trustee must proceed first against nonbank-
rupt partners to the extent practicable.4 5 In contrast, the trustee is
given a claim against bankrupt partners for the full amount of the
allowed claims46 against the partnership (ie. with no explicit exhaus-
tion requirement).47 The statute makes no distinction between joint
and several liability and joint liability.
F. Exhaustion in Joint and Several Liability
As discussed in Part IV below, where partner liability for partner-
ship obligations is joint and several, the prevailing rule is that partner-
ship assets need not be exhausted, or the partnership shown to be
insolvent, before partnership creditors can reach partners' individual
ble, the trustee shall have a claim against such general partner for the full
amount of the deficiency." 11 U.S.C. § 723(a)(1988).
43. 1d. McGraw v. Betz (In re Bell & Beckwith), 112 B.R. 863 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio
1990)(summary judgment granted trustee for $29,000,000 against each general
partner), McGraw v. Betz (In re Bell & Beckwith), 112 B.R. 871 (Bankr. N.D.
Ohio 1990)(final judgment granted trustee). See Carlton J. Eibl, Strategies for
Partners Under The Bankruptcy Code When The Partnership Is Insolvent, 61 AM.
BANK. L. J. 37, 41-44 (1987).
44. The deficiency may be estimated and does not require judicial determination. The
trustee's determination with reasonable certainty is sufficient. McGraw v. Betz
(In re Bell & Beckwith), 112 B.R. 863, 868-69 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1990)(summary
judgment granted trustee for $29,000,000 against each general partner), McGraw
v. Betz (In re Bell & Beckwith), 112 B.R. 871 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1990)(final judg-
ment granted trustee); M Bank Corpus Christi v. Seikel (In re 1-37 Gulf Ltd.
Partnership), 48 B.R. 647, 649 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 1985).
45. 11 U.S.C. § 723(b)(1988). The trustee may enforce the partner's liability by an
adversary proceeding in the Bankruptcy Court under 28 U.S.C. § 157 (1988). See,
eg., In re Bell & Beckwith, 112 B.R. 863 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1990)(summary judg-
ment granted trustee), In re Bell & Beckwith, 112 B.R. 871 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio
1191)(final judgment granted trustee).
46. See U U.S.C. § 502 (1988); see supra note 39 on allowed claims.
47. U U.S.C. § 723(c)(1988). Exhaustion is the usual practical effect, by virtue of the
§ 723(b) requirement that the trustee proceed first against nonbankrupt partners.
See Carlton J. Eibl, Strategies for Partners Under The Bankruptcy Code When
The Partnership Is Insolvent, 61 AM. BANri. L. J. 37, 44-48 (1987). Section 723(b)
was used as supporting analogy in In re Elsub Corp., 66 B.R. 182, 185-87 (Bankr.
D. N.J. 1986) on a different bankruptcy point discussed supra note 36. By al-
lowing partnership creditors (through the trustee) to share pro rata with part-
ners' individual creditors in partners' individual assets, § 723(c) overrules in
bankruptcy the dual priorities or "jingle rule" of UNiF. PARTNERSHIP ACT § 40(b),
6 U.L.A. 469 (1969) §§ 40(b), (h), (i) and 25(2)(c), that partnership creditors have
priority in partnership assets and individual creditors have priority in individual
assets. Proposed REv. UNIF. PARTNERSHIP ACT § 807 (Discussion draft 1991)
would similarly eliminate the jingle rule by dropping equivalents of UNIF. PART-
NERSHIP AcT §§ 40(h), (i), 6 U.L.A. 469 (1969) §§ 40(h), (i).
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assets to enforce their liability. This follows logically from the nature
of joint and several liability48 and contrasts with the exhaustion rule
discussed above49 where partner liability is joint for contract.5 0 One
court explained the difference this way:
Several liability is '[l]iability separate and distinct from liability of another to
the extent that an independent action may be brought without joinder of
others.' . . . The individual liability associated with partners that are not
jointly liable is not separate and distinct from the liability of all the partners
jointly. Rather, [that] individual liability arises only after it has been shown
that the partnership assets are inadequate. No direct cause of action may be
maintained against the individual partners until the above condition is met.
Several liability, on the other hand, imposes no such conditions precedent
before one can be held individually liable.5 1
However, the exhaustion requirement is described as prevailing in
some joint and several jurisdictions in decisions which do not directly
involve its application and do not discuss the difference between joint
and joint and several liability.52 It also appears to prevail as to
48. Catalina Mortgage Co. v. Monier, 800 P.2d 574 (Ariz. 1990)(en banc)(on certified
question: limited partnership's creditor may obtain judgment against general
partner and reach his assets prior to exhaustion of partnership assets; limited
partnership was in bankruptcy reorganization); Phillips v. Cook, 210 A.2d 743,
746-47 (Md. 1965); Foster v. Daon Corp., 713 F.2d 149, 151 (5th Cir. 1983)(Tex.
law)(with joint and several liability, "plaintiff has a direct right of action against
[a partner] for enforcement of this obligation, without the necessity of first pro-
ceeding against the partnership"); In re Kelsey, 6 B.R. 114, 118-19 (Bankr. S.D.
Tex. 1980)(Tex. law); Fowler Comm'n Co. v. Charles Land & Co., 248 S.W. 314
(Tex. Comm. App., adopted 1923). See Martinez v. Koelling, 228 Neb. 1, 421
N.W.2d 1, 2-3 (1988)(distinguishing joint from joint and several liability). First
City Nat'l Bank of Beaumont v. Durkay. (In re Ford), 125 B.R. 735, 738 (E.D. Tex.
1991)(Tex. and federal law; debtor's liability on partnership note as partner and
as comaker not contingent so not subject to estimation for purpose of claim allow-
ance per Bankruptcy Code 11 U.S.C. § 502(c)(1988)). But see Springer v. Bank of
Douglas, 313 P.2d 399, 401 (Ariz. 1957) (in suit against partnership and partners on
partnership note secured by mortgage, partner entitled to have mortgaged assets
applied against note before judgment entered against partner). Catalina distin-
guished Springer.
49. See supra section I.E.
50. Catalina Mortgage Co. v. Monier, 800 P.2d 574, 575 (Ariz. 1990)(en banc). See
Martinez v. Koelling, 228 Neb. 1, 3-5, 421 N.W.2d 1, 2-3 (1988).
51. Head v. Henry Tyler Construction Corp., 539 So.2d 196, 199 (Ala. 1988) (emphasis
original), quoted and followed in Catalina Mortgage Co. v. Monier, 800 P.2d 574,
578 (Ariz. 1990)(en banc) and followed in Head v. Vulcan Painters, Inc., 541 So.2d
11 (Ala. 1989). Two earlier Alabama cases supported an exhaustion requirement.
Brown v. Bateh, 331 So.2d 671, 676-77 (Ala. 1976)(dictum in construing partition
statute: partner has right to protect individual property from partnership debts if
there are enough partnership assets); Briley v. Briley, 288 So.2d 733,738 (Ala. Civ.
App. 1974)(in decree of divorce and dissolution of husband-wife partnership,
court cannot subject individual assets to payment of partnership liabilities so long
as there are partnership assets). Both cases were distinguished by Head as deal-
ing with rights and liabilities on dissolution and may have been effectively over-
ruled by it.
52. National Hygienics, Inc. v. Southern Farm Bureau Life Ins. Co., 707 F.2d 183, 187
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nonbankrupt partners in liquidation bankruptcies under federal law,
but not as to bankrupt partners, nor to any partners in reorganization
bankruptcies.53
Proposed Revised U.P.A. section 306 would impose joint and sev-
eral liability for all debts and obligations of the partnership (ie. for
contracts and torts alike).54 Proposed section 307(c)-(d) would gener-
ally adopt an exhaustion requirement before "recourse to partners' in-
dividual assets.55 More specifically, it would require an unsatisfied
judgment against the partnership unless: the partnership is in Chap-
ter 11 bankruptcy reorganization; the claimant (third party) and the
partner have agreed that exhaustion is not necessary; or the court
finds that partnership assets in the state are insufficient, that exhaus-
tion is excessively burdensome, or that the court's inherent equitable
powers are appropriately exercised to permit direct recovery against
individual assets. These last exceptions would be appropriate in tort
(5th Cir. 1983) states that a partner "is generally only personally liable after all
the assets of the partnership have been exhausted." This is in the course of hold-
ing that a partner had apparent authority under Mississippi law to settle a claim
against the partnership and obtain a release of general partners. The resulting
protection to the general partners was not notice to the claimant that the partner
lacked authority.
Norman v. Norman (In re Norman), 32 B.R. 562, 565 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1983)
states that Missouri law "appears" to require exhaustion. This is in the course of
holding that a partner's liability for the debts of a solvent partnership were not
noncontingent and therefore did not have to be counted toward the maximum
allowed for a small businessperson bankruptcy filing under Bankruptcy Code 11
U.S.C. §§ 1301-1330 (1988). The filing was upheld over the objections of the
debtor's main creditor, his ex-wife. The two cases relied on by the court for its
statement do not require exhaustion. In re Ransom, 75 B.R. 684, 686 (Bankr. E.D.
Mo. 1987)(Mo. law)(recites the exhaustion requirement but cites only Norman
for it; holds that partners' liability for partnership debt is individual, hence eligi-
ble for discharge in bankruptcy under 11 U.S.C., §§ 701-766 since partnership as-
sets have been liquidated). Disagreeing with Norman in a different bankruptcy
context is In re Elsub, 66 B.R. 172 (Bankr. D. N.J. 1986), discussed supra note 36.
The exhaustion rule was used to hold that the insurer of a joint venturer was
entitled to recover from the insurer of the coventurer and of the joint venture the
first insurer's contribution toward the settlement of a tort claim against the ven-
ture and the venturers. The second insurance was an asset of the venture and
was to be exhausted before resort to the first insurance (an individual asset of the
first venturer). Ohio Casualty Ins. Co. v. Harbor Ins. Co., 66 Cal. Rptr. 340, 346
(Ct. App. 1968).
The exhaustion rule was used to reinstate a partner's suit against his co-
partner and the copartner's father for an accounting and to enjoin the father
from foreclosing a mortgage on the partner's farm given to secure a loan to the
partnership. The accounting was necessary to determine whether there were suf-
ficient partnership assets to pay off the loan. Only if those assets were insuffi-
cient would foreclosure be proper. Casey v. Grantham, 239, 79 S.E.2d 735, 738-39
(N.C. 1954).
53. Bankruptcy Code 11 U.S.C. §§ 723(a),(c)(1988) discussed supra notes 39-47.
54. REv. UNmF. PARTNERSHn AcT § 306 (Discussion Draft 1992).
55. Id- § 307(c)(d).
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cases where the claimant could not contract around exhaustion. In
light of the factors discussed earlier in this section, it is doubtful that
there is an economic justification for the exhaustion rule. The Pro-
posed Revised Act would reverse the prevailing rule of nonexhaustion
in joint and several liability situations, and would benefit claimants
against partnerships where liability is now joint, but disadvantage
claimants where exhaustion is not now required (e.g., almost all tort
cases).
G. Exhaustion in Suits in Partnership Name
Where partnerships can be sued in the firm name along with some
or all the partners, as discussed in Part V below, the exhaustion rule is
applied when required or implied by some other statute or procedural
rule,5 6 or without discussion whether the authority to sue in the firm
name in effect creates joint and several liability that negates the ex-
haustion rule.57
II. ENFORCEMENT OF PARTNERSHIP OBLIGATIONS
AGAINST ALL PARTNERS
A. In General
This Part deals with the enforcement of partnership obligations by
suit against all the partners, which was and still is the common law
pattern. That enforcement is sufficient in almost all U.S. jurisdictions,
and it is necessary in a significant number of jurisdictions in contract
cases but not in tort cases. This Part concludes with a discussion on
the nature of the judgment.
56. ILL. CODE CIV. PROC. § 2-411(b)(by implication from authorization of unsatisfied
judgment creditor of partnership to enforce liability of a partner); Koppers Co. v
Mackie Roofing and Sheet Metal Works, 544 So.2d 25, 26 (La. Ct. App. 1989)(by
implication from LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 2817)(West 1992)(partnership as princi-
pal obligor is primarily liable for its debts) and LA. CODE Civ. PRoc. ANN. art. 737
(West 1992)(partners may not be sued unless partnership is joined); Leger v.
Townsend, 257 So.2d 761, 763 (La. Ct. App. 1972); Security State Bank v. McCoy,
219 Neb. 132, 361 N.W.2d 514 (1985)(NEB. REv. STAT. § 25-316 (1989) requires
judgment against partnership and insufficiency of its assets before execution
against individual assets); Horn's Crane Service v. Prior, 182 Neb. 94, 152 N.W.2d
421 (1967); Hall v. Oldfield Tire & Rubber Co., 158 N.E. 191, 192-93 (Ohio 1927).
57. Sargeant v. Grimes, 70 F.2d 121, 122 (10th Cir. 1934), cert. denied, 293 U.S. 568
(1934)(Colo. law); Heiden v. Beuttler, 11 F.Supp. 290, 291 (N.D. Iowa 1935)(Iowa
law); Leach v. Milburn Wagon Co., 14 Neb. 106,15 N.W. 232 (1883)(Iowa judgment
creditor failed to show no partnership assets in Nebraska); Young v. Mayfield, 316
P.2d 162, 165 (Okla. 1957) (dictum); Fowler v Brooks, 146 P.2d 304, 307, 308 (Okla.
1944). See Brown v. Bateh, 331 So.2d 671, 676-77 (Ala. 1976)(dictum in construing
partition statute: partner has right to protect individual property from partner-
ship debts if there are enough partnership assets), distinguished and perhaps
overruled by Head v. Henry Tyler Construction Corp., 539 So.2d 196 (Ala. 1988):
See also note 51 supra.
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B. Sufficiency of All Partners
A suit against all partners appears to be valid virtually everywhere
in the United States, whether the liability of the partners is joint (as in
contract in most states, as discussed in Part III below),58 or joint and
several (as in tort and breach of trust in virtually all states as dis-
cussed in Part IV),59 and whether the partnership is or is not sued
along with the partners. In at least one state, the arbitrary distinction
is made that the partners must be sued as partners rather than as
individuals.60
The law of the state of Louisiana is an exception to the sufficiency
of a suit against all partners. In this state, the partners may only be
sued along with the partnershipS' unless the partnership is insolvent
or has ceased to exist.6 2 Another exception is limited partnerships, in
which limited partners are generally not suable on partnership
obligations.6 3
From a purely legal viewpoint, a plaintiff should sue all the part-
ners on a partnership claim. But it may be impractical or unduly
costly to do so. Alternatives, such as suing the partnership or some
but fewer than all the partners, are considered in Parts III and V
below.
C. Necessity of All Partners: Contract Cases
U.P.A. section 15(b) makes partners jointly liable for "debts and
obligations of the partnership" except for those specified in U.P.A.
sections 13 (wrongful acts, e.g., torts) and 14 (breaches of trust), for
which the liability is joint and several by U.P.A. section 15(a). A
number of jurisdictions adhere to the common law requirement that
all partners must be sued and served to enforce a partnership obliga-
tion for which they are jointly liable.64 This can be considered an ap-
58. UNIF. PARTNERSHIP AcT § 15(a), 6 U.L.A. 1, 174 (1979).
59. Id. §§ 15(a), 13, 14, 6 U.L.A. 1, 174, 163, 173 (1969).
60. Broom v. Marshall, 328 S.E.2d 639 (S.C. Ct. App. 1984-85)(2-1 with strong dissent).
61. LA. CODE CIV. PROC. ANN. ART. 737 (West 1992)(partners of existing partnership
"may not be sued on a partnership obligation unless the partnership is joined as a
defendant"), applied in Melancon v. Morrison-Knudsen International Co., 329
F.Supp. 981, 983-84 (W.D. La. 1971)(two joint venturers not suable without joint
venture as a party); Stone v. Stone, 293 So.2d 523 (La. Ct. App. 1974) (one or both
partners not suable without partnership which is indispensable party).
62. LA. CODE CIv. PRoc. ANN. ART. 2872 (West 1992); Leger v. Townsend, 257 So.2d
761, 763 (La. App. 1972).
63. UNF. LTD. PARTNERSuiP Acr §§ 7, 26; 6 U.L.A. 559, 582, 614 (1969) § 303; REVISED
UNiF. LTD. PARTNERSHip Acr, 6 U.L.A. 239, 325-26 (1976 & Supp. 1991)(amended
1985); Richard Matthews, Jr., Inc. v. Vaughn, 540 P.2d 1062, 1066 (Nev. 1975).
64. E.g., Brown & Bigelow v. Roy, 132 N.E.2d 755 (Ohio Ct. App. 1955)(but finding
waiver by failure to demur); Mansour v. Massey, 336 S.E.2d 15 (S.C. 1985)(revers-




plication of the aggregate theory of partnership as discussed in Part 165
if the partnership is regarded as an inseparable collection of individu-
als unmodified by any statutes, procedural rules or exceptions of the
kind discussed in Parts III and V below. The common law view dies
hard, as at least one major court has read a joint and several partner-
ship statute as not changing the common law.66
The obligations for which U.P.A. section 15 creates joint liability
are not limited to monetary obligations, but include contracts and the
obligations to perform them.67 Thus, partners generally may not be
sued individually on partnership contracts.68 This result is sometimes
reached by characterizing the partners as indispensable parties. 69 The
necessity, then, is to sue all partners with the limited exceptions de-
scribed in Parts III and V below.
The New York rule has been described in slightly different terms
which emphasize the conditional nature of copartner indispensability:
"The joint nature of the obligation does not imply that the joint obli-
gor is immune from being sued individually (citation omitted). It only
gives the joint obligor the right to insist that the plaintiff join other
such obligors if joinder be possible."70 However, the effect may be
much the same, since a partner sued individually without the copart-
ners will usually insist (e.g., by a motion to dismiss) that they be ad-
ded. But, if the defendant partner fails to make a proper objection, he
or she waives the right to have the copartners joined and the suit pro-
ceeds against the defendant partner alone.71 New York's statutes,
which produce similar results, are discussed in Part III below.72
D. Necessity of All Partners: Tort and Trust Breach Cases
Where partners are jointly and severally liable for partnership
acts, as U.P.A. section 15(a) makes them by reference to U.P.A. sec-
65. See supra section I.C.
66. Seligman v. Friedlander, 92 N.E. 1047, 1048-49 (N.Y. 1910), sharply criticized in
Francis M. Burdick, Joint and Several Liability of Partners, 11 CoLUM. L. REv.
101, 114-19 (1911).
67. Hartford Fin. Sys., Inc. v. Florida Software Servs., Inc., 550 F.Supp. 1079, 1088 (D.
Me. 1982)(Maine law), appeal dismissed, 712 F.2d 724 (1st Cir. 1983)(obligation to
arbitrate pursuant to agreement); Bank of Commerce v. DeSantis, 451 N.Y.S.2d
974, 978 (Civ. Ct. 1982).
68. See Meyer v. Park South Assocs., 159 A.D.2d 337, 552 N.Y.S.2d 614 (1990)(viola-
tion of lease); discussed infra note 74 (court notes exception if partnership is in-
solvent or otherwise unable to pay).
69. Jones Knitting Corp. v. A.M. Pullen & Co., 50 F.R.D. 311, 314-15 (S.D. N.Y. 1970).
70. Cunard Line Ltd. v. Abney, 540 F.Supp. 657, 659 (S.D. N.Y. 1982)(dismissed be-
cause of failure to allege partnership insolvency required by New York law).
71. Seligman v. Friedlander, 92 N.E. 1047, 1050-51 (N.Y. 1910). Similar waiver hold-
ings are discussed infra note 86.
72. See infra section III.C.
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tion 13 for wrongful acts (e.g., torts73 ) and to U.P.A. section 14 for
breaches of trust, any one or more of them may be sued without the
others and without the partnership.74 They are proper parties, not in-
dispensable75 or necessary.76 Thus there is no necessity that all part-
ners be sued. This issue is discussed further in Part IV below.
E. Judgment and Enforcement
In a suit against all the partners on a partnership obligation, judg-
ment may be entered against all the partners. In some states, judg-
ment can also be entered against the partnership if the partners have
been identified as such in the pleadings, 77 and the partnership is recog-
nized as an entity to this extent. The judgment is enforceable against
their joint property (i.e. the partnership assets).7s It is also enforcea-
ble against the individual partners named and served. However, in
most states where liability is joint, the judgment cannot be executed
against individual partners until partnership assets are exhausted or
the partnership is shown to be insolvent as discussed in Part I above.79
III. ENFORCEMENT OF PARTNERSHIP OBLIGATIONS
AGAINST FEWER THAN ALL PARTNERS:
CONTRACT CASES-JOINT LIABILITY
A. In General
This Part focuses on liability of partners for partnership contract
obligations. This liability is joint in many states, typically calling for a
suit against all the partners if the common law has not been modified.
However, the common law has been extensively modified by partner-
ship or joint debtor statutes or procedural rules to permit suits against
fewer than all the partners.8 0 This Part discusses the related ques-
tions of parties, service of process, enforcement and effect of judg-
ments and concludes with a discussion on agreements between
73. Bank of Commerce v. DeSantis, 451 N.Y.S.2d 974, 977 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. 1982).
74. E.g., Meyer v. Park South Associates, 552 N.Y.S.2d 614, 616 (App. Div. 1990)(part-
ner of landlord partnership may be sued individually for partnership's alleged
harrassment of tenant but not for alleged causes of action arising out of the
lease).
75. Benvenuto v. Taubman, 690 F.Supp. 149, 152 (E.D. N.Y. 1988)(N.Y. law); Jones
Knitting Corp. v. A.M. Pullen & Co., 50 F.R.D. 311, 315 (S.D. N.Y. 1970).
76. Clark v. Inn West, 365 S.E.2d 682, 686 (N.C. Ct. App. 1988), rev'd on other
grounds, 379 S.E.2d 23 (N.C. 1989).
77. See Frazier v. Carlin, 591 P.2d 1348, 1350 (Colo. Ct. App. 1979)(judgment against
limited partnership proper when suit was against its two general partners, identi-
fied as such; notice to general partners sufficient to satisfy due process for
partnership).
78. E.g., Carter v. Love, 394 P.2d 472, 476 (Okla. 1964).
79. See supra sections I.D and LE.
80. See infra section III.C.
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partners and third parties that may alter partner liability for partner-
ship contracts.
B. Without Statute or Procedural Rule
As discussed in Part II above, partner liability for partnership con-
tracts is classified as joint in most states by U.P.A. section 15(b). In
those states, each partner is considered liable for the full amount of
the contract,8 1 although the plaintiff is entitled to only one satisfac-
tion.82 But enforcement of that liability is not directly available. All
the partners must generally be sued.8 3 Thus a release or dismissal of
one partner discharges all.84 There are exceptions to the required suit
against all partners if a partner is bankrupt, dead, or beyond the juris-
diction of the court,8 5 or if a partner sued fails to plead properly the
nonjoinder of the other partner(s).6 In addition, there are numerous
exceptions by statutes or procedural rules as discussed below.
Where all partners must be sued, states differ in how many part-
ners must be served. Some hold that service on one partner (or fewer
81. E.g., Moseley, Hallgarten, Estabrook & Weeden, Inc. v. Ellis, 849 F.2d 264, 271
(7th Cir. 1988) (Ellis argued unsuccessfully in the trial court that as a 50% partner
he was liable for only 50% of the debt, but did not appeal this point); Midwood
Dev. Corp. v. K 12th Associates, 537 N.Y.S.2d 237, 239 (App. Div. 1989)("[e]ach
partner is liable for the whole amount of every debt of the partnership, not
merely for a proportionate part;" affirming judgment against partnership and one
partner); Patrikes v. J.C.H. Serv. Stations, Inc., 41 N.Y.S.2d 158 (City Ct. 1943),
aff'd_, 46 N.Y.S.2d 233 (Sup. Ct. 1943)(three partners not relieved of joint obliga-
tion on lease or entitled to return of security deposit although one of them would
have been relieved by military induction and Soldiers and Sailors Relief Act if
individual obligation). RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 289(1)(1981)(for
joint obligors generally).
82. Moseley, Hallgarten, Estabrook & Weeden, Inc. v. Ellis, 849 F.2d at 272.
83. Supra section II.C; Brown & Bigelow v. Roy, 132 N.E.2d 755 (Ohio Ct. App.
1955)(but finding waiver by failure to demur); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CON-
TRACTS § 290(2)(1981)(for joint obligors generally).
84. Baley v. Davis, 267 P.2d 631, 633 (Idaho 1954)(dismissal); RESTATEMENT (SEC-
OND) OF CONTRACTS § 294(1)(a)(1981). This common law rule is discussed but not
followed in Eastern Elec. Co. v. Taylor Woodrow Blitman Constr. Corp., 414
N.E.2d 1023 (Mass. App. Ct. 1981) where the dismissal of plaintiff's claim against
one joint venturer (for plaintiff's failure to answer that venturer's interrogato-
ries) permitted plaintiff to proceed against the other joint venturer. The court
expressed modern dissatisfaction with the traditional rule, but did not completely
reject it.
85. Donald Manter Co. v. Davis, 543 F.2d 419, 420 (1st Cir. 1976)(N.H. law); Spencer
Kellogg & Sons, Inc. v. Bush, 219 N.Y.S.2d 453. 455 (Sup. Ct. 1961). RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 290(2)(1981)(for joint obligors generally).
86. Mason v. Eldred, 73 U.S. 231 (1867); Seligman v. Friedlander, 92 N.E. 1047, 1050-51
(N.Y. 1910); In re Merrill Lynch Relocation Management, Inc., 812 F.2d 1117,
1123-24 (9th Cir. 1987)(Or. law); Brown & Bigelow v. Roy, 132 N.E.2d 755 (Ohio
App. 1955)(waiver). See Moseley, Hallgarten, Estabrook & Weeden, Inc. v. Ellis,
849 F.2d 264,270 (7th Cir. 1988)(Ill. law)(partner bound by arbitration to which he
submitted without copartner) and note 71 supra.
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than all) suffices to give jurisdiction over the partnership to the extent
the partnership is recognized s 7 Failure to serve may be waived (e.g.,
by appearance at trial).88 If one partner answers, default judgment
cannot be entered against others who fail to answer because a valid
defense by the answering partner will normally protect the other part-
ners as well.89 A judgment in the plaintiff's favor is enforceable only
against property of the partnership (the joint property of the part-
ners) and of the partners served.90 However, in most states with joint
liability, the judgment is enforceable against the partners served only
if the property of the partnership is insufficient (i.e. is first exhausted)
as explained in Part I above.9 ' If judgment is taken against fewer than
all the partners, the common law rule is that the claim is merged in
the judgment and therefore cannot be pursued against the remaining
partners.92 A judgment against all the partners is enforceable against
partnership property as well as against the partners' individual
property.9 3
C. With Statute or Procedural Rule
U.P.A. section 15 has been modified in about a dozen states to pre-
scribe joint and several liability of partners for all partnership obliga-
tions, including those based on contract as well as those based on
tort.9 The proposed Revised U.P.A. section 306 would do the same.95
Where a statute of this kind prevails, contract plaintiffs may sue any
or all of the partners, with or without the partnership, as discussed
87. Diamond Nat'l Corp. v. Thunderbird Hotel, Inc., 454 P.2d 13, 15 (Nev. 1969); L. C.
Jones Trucking Co. v. Superior Oil Co., 234 P.2d 802, 807-14 (Wyo. 1951)(garnish-
ment of sum owed partnership valid; exhaustive discussion of cases requiring ser-
vice on all partners and those permitting service on fewer than all).
88. Baum v. Glen Park Properties, 660 S.W.2d 723,725-26 (Mo. Ct. App. 1983)(service
on an assistant vice president; partnership lawyer appeared, one partner was in
court; property suit).
89. Spencer Kellogg & Sons, Inc. v. Bush, 219 N.Y.S.2d 453 (Sup. Ct. 1961).
90. Id- at 455. See L. C. Jones Trucking Co. v. Superior Oil Co., 234 P.2d 802 (Wyo.
1951) and supra note 87.
91. See supra sections I.D and I.E.
92. Mason v. Eldred, 73 U.S. 231 (1868); Salem v. Siegel, 126 N.Y.S.2d 214,216-17 (Sup.
Ct. 1953); Iwanaga v. Hagopian, 179 P. 523 (Cal. 1919); In re Merrill Lynch Reloca-
tion Management, Inc., 812 F.2d 1116, 1123-24 (9th Cir. 1987)(Or. law); Jefferson
State Bank v. Welch, 702 P.2d 414 (Or. In Banc 1985)(discussing common law
merger and related "all or none" rules but finding them inapplicable because no
final judgment had been entered against a defaulting partner).
93. Palkovitz v. Second Fed. Say. and Loan Assoc., 195 A.2d 347, 349 (Pa. 1963); Ber-
ger Realty Group, Inc. v. Bradly Realty Corp., 690 F.Supp. 1392 (E.D Pa. 1987)(Pa.
law)(where judgment against partners represents a partnership debt).
94. E.g., ALA. CODE § 10-8-52 (1987)("except as may be otherwise provided by law");
ARiz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 29-215 (1989); COLO. REV. STAT. § 7-60-115 (1986); GA.
CODE ANN. § 14-8-15 (Harrison 1990); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 56.315 (1983); MiSs.
CODE ANN. § 79-12-29 (1972); Mo. REV. STAT. § 358.150 (1968); N.C. GEN. STAT.
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more fully below.96 Judgments are against the parties named and
served97 and do not discharge other partners.98 The judgments are
enforceable against the property of the partners named and served,
generally subject to exhaustion of partnership assets before recourse
to individual assets, as discussed in Part 199 above. 0 0 Release of one
partner generally does not discharge the others.01
At least one state has a rule permitting suit against fewer than all
the partners' 02 with the judgment enforceable against the partnership
and the partners named and served. 0 3 Another state permits suit
against fewer than all the partners if the others cannot be found. 0 4
Where partners are sufficiently numerous, a suit may be maintained
against all the partners as a class by suing representative partners se-
lected by plaintiff, on satisfaction of the many other complex class re-
quirements (e.g., typicality, common questions, adequacy of the
representatives, superiority of a class action). 05
A number of states have joint debtor or joint obligor statutes or
§ 59-45 (1991); ORE. REV. STAT. § 68.270 (1991); TENN. CODE ANN. § 61-1-114; TEX.
REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 6132a § 15 (West 1970).
U.P.A. drafters anticipated that states might make this modification; See
supra note 14, and accompanying text.
95. REV. UNIF. PARTNERSHIP ACT § 306 (Discussion Draft 1992).
96. Cone Mills Corp. v. Hurdle, 369 F.Supp. 426, 438 (N.D. Miss. 1974)(Miss. law);
Foster v. Daon Corp., 713 F.2d 148 (5th Cir. 1983)(Texas law). See infra section
IV.B.
97. See REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 291 (1981)(for joint obligors
generally).
98. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 292 (1981)(for joint and several obligors
generally). The third party is, of course, entitled to only one satisfaction of the
contract. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 293 (1981).
99. See supra sections D and E of Part I.
100. See In re Peck, 99 N.E. 258 (N.Y. 1912)(pre U.P.A. tort case). See also sections D
and E of Part I.
101. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 294(1)(b)(1981).
102. PA. R. Civ. P. 2128(a): "An action against a partnership may be prosecuted against
one or more partners as individuals trading as the partnership ......
103. PA. R. Civ. P. 2132(b)(if jurisdiction has been validly obtained).
104. GA. CODE ANN. § 3-301 (Harrison 1991).
105. FED. R. Civ. P. 23. See In re American Continental Corp/Lincoln Sav. and Loan
Sec. Litig., Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 95,704 (D. Ariz. Oct. 31, 1990)(certifying
defendant class of partners of three accounting firms under FED. R. Civ. P.
23(b)(3); over 1000 class members in each firm; commonality and predominance
satisfied by joint and several liability of partners for partnership obligations
under Arizona and California versions of U.P.A. § 15; managing partners will be
adequate representatives); Alexander Grant & Co v. McAlister, 116 F.R.D. 583
(S.D. Ohio 1987)(certifying counterdefendant class of 300 partners of accounting
firm under FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(1)(B) and 23(b)(3); one partner will be adequate
representative); In re Alexander Grant & Co. Litigation, 110 F.R.D. 528, 532-38
(S.D. Fla. 1986)(similar; FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(1)(B)). Similar results are possible
under state class action rules. Class action prerequisites are designed, among
other things, to satisfy due process requirements.
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rules which effectively create joint and several liability by permitting
suit against any one or more of the joint obligors (partners), some-
times in addition to the partnership,106 with judgment enforceable
against the individual property of the partners sued and served and
the joint (partnership) property. 07 Some of these statutes authorize a
relatively summary later proceeding against a partner who was not
sued and served in the prior proceedingLO8 to obtain a judgment
against that partner which is enforceable against his or her individual
property. As a result, the claim based on the contract is not merged in
or extinguished by the first judgment.
Prominent among the states with joint obligor statutes is New
York, whose jurisprudence is more fully developed than elsewhere.
106. E.g., ARIz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 44-141 (1987)(all parties to a joint obligation shall be
severally liable also); ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-61-111 (Michie 1987)(joint obligation
shall be construed to have the same effect as joint and several); CALIF. CIV. PROC.
CODE § 410.70 (West 1973)(in action against persons jointly liable on contract,
court "has jurisdiction to proceed against such of the defendants as are served as
if they were the only defendants"); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 2701 (1974)(obligation
of several persons shall be joint and several); D.C. CODE ANN. § 16-2101 (1981)(ob-
ligation of two or more persons deemed joint and several); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 16-
104 (1988)(suits may be brought against any one or more of those jointly liable);
MONT. CODE ANN. § 28-1-302 (1991)(joint obligations shall be taken and held to be
joint and several); NEV. REV. STAT. § 14.060 (1991)(in suit against defendants
jointly indebted on contract where not all are served, plaintiff may proceed
against defendant served unless court otherwise directs; judgment may be en-
tered against all defendants enforceable against their joint property and separate
property of defendant served), applied in Diamond Nat'l Corp. v. Thunderbird
Hotel, Inc., 454 P.2d 13, 14-16 (Nev. 1969); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 38-4-3 (Michie
1978)(joint contracts shall be held and construed to be joint and several), applied
in Gallegos v. Citizens Ins. Agency, 779 P.2d 99 (N.M. 1989)(partner who settled
with plaintiff not indispensable party in plaintiff's suit against copartner); N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 1-113 (1983)("unless the court otherwise directs.. ."); OR. R. Civ. P.
67E(2)(in action against parties jointly indebted, judgment may be taken against
less than all); S.D. CODIFIED LAws Ann. § 15-8-2 (1984)(in action against joint
obligors, plaintiff may proceed against defendant served unless court directs
otherwise).
107. Hancock v. Southgate, 119 S.E. 364 (N.C. 1923).
108. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-113(4)(1983): "the plaintiff, in case the judgment remains un-
satisfied, may by action recover of. such partner [not named in the suit] sepa-
rately, upon proving his joint liability...." N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-114 (1983) "When
a judgment is recovered against one or more of several persons jointly indebted
upon a contract in accordance with the preceding section (§ 1-113), those who
were not originally summoned to answer the complaint may be summoned to
show cause why they should not be bound by the judgment, in the same manner
as if they had been originally summoned. A party so summoned may answer...
denying the judgment, or setting up any defense thereto which has arisen subse-
quent to such judgment; and may make any defense which he might have made to
the action if the summons had been served on him originally." CALIF. Civ. PRoc.
CODE §§ 989-994 (West 1980) are similar to the N. C. section just quoted. OR. R.
Civ. P. 67E(2), applied in Jefferson State Bank v. Welch, 702 P.2d 414 (Or.
1985)(en banc), allows a later judgment in the same action.
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New York's statutes impliedly require that all the partners be named
as defendantslo 9 but not that they all be served:
Where less than all of the named defendants in an action based upon a
joint obligation, contract or liability are served with the summons, the plain-
tiff may proceed against the defendants served, unless the court otherwise di-
rects, and if the judgment is for the plaintiff it may be taken against all the
defendants.1 1 0
The judgment may be enforced against the joint property (ie. the
partnership property).111 Despite the contrary suggestion in the
quoted language, the judgment may not be enforced against the indi-
vidual property of a partner unless the partner was served,1 2 and it
may be enforced against the served partners only if it cannot be satis-
fied from partnership property. 1 3 However, if the judgment remains
unsatisfied after enforcement against the partnership and served part-
ner(s), a separate suit on the judgment may be brought against any
previously unserved partner to obtain a judgment enforceable against
the individual property of that partner.1 1 4 That partner may raise any
defense or counterclaim he or she could have raised if served in the
original suit.1 1 5 One Court of Appeals decision goes further holding
that a limited partner who has received a return of contribution (and
is therefore liable to the partnership under U.L.P.A. section 17(4)) is
bound by the judgment against the partnership and, if sued on this
judgment, may defend only by showing he or she is not a limited part-
109. Spencer Kellogg & Sons, Inc. v. Bush, 219 N.Y.S.2d 453, 455 (Sup. Ct. 1961).
110. N.Y. Crv. PRAc. L. & R. § 1501 (McKinney 1976); N.Y. Civ. PRAC. L. & R. §§ 310
(McKinney 1991)("Personal service upon persons conducting a business as a part-
nership may be made by personally serving the summons within the state upon
any one of them").
111. N.Y. Civ. PRAC. L. & R. § 5201(b)(McKinney 1976)("A money judgment entered
upon a joint liability of two or more persons may be enforced against individual
property of those persons summoned and joint property of such persons with any
other persons against whom the judgment is entered"), applied in Gotham Air
Conditioning Serv., Inc. v. Heitner, 544 N.Y.S.2d 703 (Civ. Ct. 1989)(suit maintain-
able against partner and partnership when copartner not served). See Tehran-
Berkeley Civil and Envtl. Eng'rs v. Tippetts-Abbett-McCarthy-Stratton, 888 F.2d
239 (2d Cir. 1989)(one of two joint venturers [regarded under New York law as
partners and as joint obligors on a contract with third party] ordered to arbitra-
tion pursuant to the contract).
112. N.Y. Civ. PRAc. L. & R. § 5201(b)(McKinney 1976); Levin v. Total Hockey As-
socs., 406 N.Y.S.2d 554 (App. Div.)(1978).
113. Wisnouse v. Telsey, 367 F.Supp. 855, 858-60 (S.D. N.Y. 1973)(N.Y. law); Ira Rubin,
P.C. v. A. C. Kluger & Co., 383 N.Y.S.2d 828, 831 (Civ. Ct. 1976). See supra sec-
tions D and E of Part I.
114. N.Y. Civ. PRAC. L. & R. § 1502 (McKinney 1976), applied in Lauratex Textile
Corp. v. Gorin, 322 N.Y.S.2d 76 (App. Div. 1971) to confirm an arbitration award
against a partner who was not known at the time the award was made against his
copartner. COMPARE N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-113(4)(1983), supra note 108.
115. N.Y. Civ. PRAc. L. & R. § 1502 (McKinney 1976). Accordingly, the plaintiff is not




ner or did not receive a return of contribution covered by that
section.1 1 6
There is New York authority that fewer than all the partners can-
not be sued individually without first obtaining a judgment against the
partnership or showing that partnership property is insufficient. 1 7
This exhaustion requirement is discussed in Part 1.118 Indeed, there is
authority that a New York complaint against individual partners fails
to state a claim unless it alleges partnership insolvency.119 Requiring
depletion of firm assets (or a showing that there are none) before per-
mitting suit against a partner is an extension of the exhaustion rule
which only requires depletion of firm assets before collection from a
partner. Efficiency considerations support letting a plaintiff maintain
suit against any or all the partners, even though exhaustion of part-
nership assets must precede collection from the partner, because a sin-
gle suit is less costly than an original suit followed by one or more
separate suits, if needed, to collect from one or more partners after
exhaustion of partnership assets.
Later, and better reasoned, authority allows a suit to proceed
against individual partners since they may become liable if the part-
nership assets prove insufficient and there appears to be no effective
remedy without resort to individual property.120
New York permits a separate suit against the partnership in the
firm name1 21 with service on any one or more partners, 22 as discussed
in Part V below.
116. Whitley v. Klauber, 416 N.E.2d 569,576 (N.Y. 1980)(5-2 on this point). The major-
ity disclaims collateral estoppel but reaches this result "because the partnership,
in whose right the creditor sues the limited partners to recover partnership assets
(the capital, though rightfully returned), has already fully litigated its obligation
to the creditor as such." I&L at 570.
117. Wisnouse v. Telsey, 367 F.Supp. 855, 859 (S.D. N.Y. 1973)(N.Y. law); Helmsley v.
Cohen, 391 N.Y.S.2d 522 (App. Div. 1977).
118. See supra sections D and E of Part I.
119. Owen Steel Co. v. George A. Fuller Co., 563 F.Supp. 298, 300 (S.D. N.Y. 1983)(con-
tract breach complaint against partners dismissed); Pine Plains Lumber Corp. v.
Messina, 435 N.Y.S.2d 381, 384 (App. Div. 1981); Cunard Line Ltd. v. Abney, 540
F.Supp. 657, 660 (S.D. N.Y. 1982).
120. Propoco, Inc. v. Birnbaum, 550 N.Y.S.2d 901 (1990); Midwood Dev. Corp. v. K 12th
Assocs., 537 N.Y.S.2d 237, 239 (App. Div. 1989)(affirming judgment against part-
nership and partner but noting that it "does not alter the longstanding rule that a
judgment creditor generally must look to partnership property first.. ."). See
Bank of Commerce v. DeSantis, 451 N.Y.S.2d 974, 978 (Civ. Ct. 1982)(suit against
partnership and partners; judgment against partner on finding partnership assets
insufficient).
121. N.Y. Crv. PRAc. L. & R. § 1025 (McKinney 1976).
122. N.Y. Civ. PRAC. L. & R. § 310 (McKinney 1991), applied in Bensaull v. Fanwood




U.P.A. section 15(b) adds to its prescription of joint liability of part-
ners for partnership debts and obligations: "but any partner may enter
into a separate obligation to perform a partnership contract." The sep-
arate obligation may take various forms including a provision in the
partnership's contract with a third party that specified partners are
individually obligated to perform the contract,123 a separate agree-
ment to that effect, or a guarantee of the partnership's performance of
the contract. The separate obligation in effect makes joint and several
the liability of the partner(s) who have given the separate obligation.
When there is a separate obligation, it may be sued on without joining
the other partners, and a judgment may be entered on this separate
obligation. 24 The judgment is enforceable against the individual
property of the partner(s) sued and served.
Similarly, partners may, by contract with a third party, make their
liability joint and several25 or several only.12 6 Alternatively, they
may limit their joint liability by making it nonrecourse as to one or
more partners,12 7 or by specifying the maximum liability of some or
all the partners.128 U.P.A. section 15 does not prohibit agreements of
this kind.129 Less formal methods of contracting against liability may
be recognized.130
An agreement among partners that purports to limit their individ-
ual liability on partnership obligations is effective among themselves
123. See, e.g., Langdon v. Hurdle, 189 S.E.2d 517 (N.C. 1972)(surviving partners as-
sumed partnership obligation to make payments to deceased partner's estate by
agreement with executrix).
124. Thriftway Lumber Co. v. Tisherman, 672 P.2d 236 (Idaho 1983)(suit against all
partners; judgment against only partner found, on evidence, to have agreed to pay
entire partnership debt).
125. E.g., In re Ford, 125 B.R. 735, 738 (Bankr. E.D. Tex. 1991)(partnership note speci-
fied liability of each signing partner for full amount; second note specified joint
and several liability of partners); Greidinger v. Hoffberg, 370 N.Y.S.2d 934, 936
(App. Div. 1975)(lease specified joint and several liability of partners of tenant
firm).
126. 628 Harvard Assocs. v. Pensacola Warehouse, Ltd., 483 So.2d 132 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1986).
127. See Lenkin v. Beckman, 575 A.2d 273 (D.C. 1990)(lease specified no personal lia-
bility of partners of landlord or of partners of tenant but did not thereby preclude
reaching assets of tenant partnership even though partnership could not be sued
as an entity).
128. 628 Harvard Assocs. v. Pensacola Warehouse, Ltd., 483 So.2d 132 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1986)(lease provided tenants liable in proportion to their interests in part-
nership; judgment for landlord accordingly).
129. Id.
130. Larry E. Ribstein, Limited Liability and Theories of the Corporation, 50 MD. L.
REV. 80 (1991)(discusses law and policy of limited liability in a variety of situa-
tions including, at 112-14, informal contract where a company or partnership
identifies itself as having limited liability).
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(e.g., for indemnification or contribution).131 Such an agreement is
generally not effective against a third party, 3 2 although it may be if
the third party has knowledge of the limiting agreement when con-
tracting with the partnership.133 A similar principle applies to limita-
tions on a partner's authority to bind the firm. 3 4
IV. ENFORCEMENT OF PARTNERSHIP OBLIGATIONS
AGAINST FEWER THAN ALL PARTNERS: TORT




This Part focuses on liability of partners for partnership tort and
trust breach obligations. That liability is joint and several almost
everywhere in the U.S., allowing suit against any one or more of the
partners, is discussed below. Partner liability for partnership con-
tracts is joint and several by statute in some states, considered below
and in Part III above. 3 5 Other statutes or procedural rules similarly
permitting suits against fewer than all the partners are noted below.
The related questions of parties, service of process and enforcement
and effect of judgments are also considered.
B. Under the Uniform Partnership Act
Joint and several liability is prescribed for partnership wrongful
acts (e.g., torts) and trust breaches' 3 6 by U.P.A. sections 15(a), 13 and
14. This liability is for the full amount of the damages and permits
suits against one or more partners individually without suing the
other partners,137 and generally without suing the partnership.138 As
131. See supr note 2.
132. In re McManis, 70 B.R. 171, 174 (Bankr. E.D. Ky. 1986)(Ky. law); Dominion Nat'l
Bank v. Sundowner Joint Venture, 436 A.2d 501, 508-13 (Md. 1982). See Security
State Bank v. Gugelman, 230 Neb. 842, 434 N.W.2d 290, 293 (1989)(partnership
agreement purporting to deny partners' authority to bind each others' individual
assets contrary to law and invalid against creditors, even those with notice).
133. Union Trust Co. v. Poor & Alexander, Inc., 177 A. 923 (Md. 1935); Demas v. Con-
vention Motor Inns, 232 S.E.2d 724, 726-27 (S.C. 1977).
134. UNiu. PARTNERsimp Acr § 9(4), 6 U.L.A. 1, 133 (1969); 2 BROMBERG & RIBSTEIN,
supra note 1, § 4.02(c).
135. See supra section HI.C.
136. See, e.g., Benvenuto v. Taubman, 690 F.Supp. 149, 151 (E.D. N.Y. 1988)(N.Y.
law) (participation in breach of trustee's fiduciary duties).
137. E.g., Cunard Line Ltd. v. Abney, 540 F.Supp. 657, 659 (S.D. N.Y. 1982)(N.Y. law);
Malisewski v. Singer, 598 P.2d 1014 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1979)(partner not indispensa-
ble party in fraud and contract breach suit v. copartners); Pearson v. Norton, 40
Cal. Rptr. 634, 642 (Dist. Ct. App. 1964)(partner liable for copartner's misrepre-
sentation though lacking knowledge of it); Martinez v. Koelling, 228 Neb. 1, 4,421
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one court put it (in a state also allowing suit against the partnership
entity): "When a tort is committed by the firm, the wrong is imputa-
ble to all of the partners jointly and severally, and an action may be
brought against all or any of them in their individual capacities.., or
against the partnership as an entity. 3 9 Thus, an innocent partner can
be held liable for a copartner's tort,140 even, by a minority view, for
related punitive damages in some instances. 141 It is not necessary that
N.W.2d 1, 3 (1988); Gearhart v. Angeloff, 244 N.E.2d 802 (Ohio Ct. App.
1969)(partner liable for copartner's negligent gunshot); Johnson v. King, 426
S.W.2d 196 (Tenn. 1968)(assuming two defendants were partners, either or both
could have been sued for negligence, so jury verdict in favor of one was not res
judicata for other; privity was lacking); Key v. Davis, 554 S.W.2d 60, 65 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1977)(partner not necessary party in malpractice suit v. copartners; venue
case).
138. Truscott v. Peterson, 50 N.W.2d 245, 254-55 (N.D. 1951)(one partner properly sued
without copartner or partnership).
139. Pedersen v. Manitowoc Co., 255 N.E.2d 146 (N.Y. 1969)(negligence or unseawor-
thiness of vessel; joint venture treated as partnership). Accord In re Peck, 99 N.E.
258, 260 (N.Y. 1912)(conversion claim allowed against one partner's assignee for
benefit of creditors; pre U.P.A.).
140. Bisno v. Hyde, 290 F.2d 560 (9th Cir. 1961)(Nev. law; wife partner liable for hus-
band copartner's conversion of plaintiff's funds); In re Securities Groups, 89 B.R.
204, 215 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1988)(N.Y. law; partner liable for copartners' misap-
propriation of partnership property and opportunity; liability does not require
participation in or knowledge of the copartners' acts); Clients' Sec. Fund v.
Grandeau, 526 N.E.2d 270 (N.Y. 1988)(lawyer partner liable for copartner's negli-
gence, breach of contract and breach of trust including misappropriation of funds
of 373 clients); Saikin v. New York Life Ins. Co., 360 N.W.2d 413, 416 (1. App. Ct.
1977) (partners liable for copartner's wrongful borrowing against non partnership
insurance policies when proceeds used in partnership business); Olson v. Fraase,
421 N.W.2d 820, 832-33 (N.D. 1988)(lawyer partner liable for copartner's malprac-
tice (failure to place property in joint tenancy when requested by client)); Keech
v. Mead Johnson & Co., 580 A.2d 1374 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1990)(partner may be liable
for copartner's medical malpractice); Bergh v. Mills, 763 P.2d 214, 217 (Wyo.
1988)(partners liable for copartner's fraud in inducing plaintiffs to buy shares in
corporation to which partnership planned to lease land and building). See Pear-
son v. Norton, 40 Cal. Rptr. 634 (Dist. Ct. App. 1964), Zuckerman v. Antenucci,
478 N.Y.S.2d 578 (Sup. Ct. 1984)(suit against partner and copartner for medical
malpractice; partner found not negligent, copartner found negligent; judgment
entered against each). Cases are collected in J.R. Kemper, Annotation, Vicarious
Liability of Attorney for Tort of Partner in Law Firm, 70 A.L.R.3d 1298 (1976).
141. Meliski v. Pinero Int'l Restaurant, Inc., 424 A.2d 784, 790-93, (Md. Ct. Spec. App.
1981)(copartners liable for punitive damages for partner's sale of nonexistent li-
quor license); Rogers v. Hickerson, 716 S.W.2d 439, 447 (Mo. Ct. App. 1986)(co-
partner liable for punitive damages for partner's misrepresentations in sale of
partnership land made within the scope of his authority). Contra Glass Design
Imports, Inc. v. Import Specialties, 867 F.2d 1139, 1143-44 (8th Cir 1989) rev'1 on
this point 672 F.Supp. 419, 423 (W.D. Mo. 1987)(Mo. law)(copartners not liable for
punitive damages for misrepresentations "primarily" made by partner;, copart-
ners had right to have their conduct considered separately for the purpose of de-
termining whether they had the legal malice [intentional doing of a wrongful act
without just cause] necessary for punitive damages); In re WPMK Corp., 59 B.R.
991, 995-97 (Bankr. D. Haw. 1986)(Haw. law)(U.P.A. § 15 does not change com-
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the copartner or the partnership be sued.142 Tort is, of course, a broad
category that includes virtually all non-contract claims.
In a dramatic break from tradition, Texas, in 1991, permitted part-
nerships to relieve partners from any liability for most partnership
obligations arising from certain of another partner's (or an em-
ployee's) torts.143 A partnership may achieve this registered limited
liability partnership status by filing identifying information with the
secretary of state, paying a fee of $100 per partner, adding "L.L.P."
(for limited liability partnership) to its name, and carrying $100,000 of
insurance designed to cover the kind of torts for which partner liabil-
ity is limited by the statute.144 The status is good for a year and may
be renewed in the same way. A partner remains liable for his or her
own torts and, to an extent, for partnership obligations arising from
torts of other partners or employees working under the partner's su-
pervision or direction.145 Partnerships remain liable for torts of their
partners (and employees).
Joint and several liability for contracts (as well as torts and trust
breaches) is specified in some states' modifications of U.P.A. section
15, usually by reference to "all obligations" of the partnership,146 as
mon law rejection of vicarious liability for punitive damages); Husted v. McCloud,
450 N.E.2d 491, 495 (Ind. 1983); Wright v. E-Z Fin. Co., 267 S.W.2d 602, 606 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1954)(statutory double damages for usury regarded as penalties). Cases
are collected in Michael A. Rosenhouse, Annotation, Derivative Liability of Part-
ner for Punitive Damages for Wrongful Act of Copartner, 14 A.L.R.4th 1335
(1982).
142. Smith v. Wohl, 702 S.W.2d 905, 910-11 (Mo. Ct. App. 1985)(copartner not neces-
sary party on contract breach case where contract liability is joint and several).
143. Act effective Aug. 26, 1991, ch. 901 §§ 83-85, 1991 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. 3234-5
(Vernon)(codified as amended at TEx. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 6132b §§ 2 and 15
(West 1970 & Supp. 1992)). (The Act also added §§ 45-A, 45-B and 45-C to art.
6132b) TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 6132b § 15(2)(West 1970 & Supp. 1992) now
reads:
"A partner in a registered limited liability partnership is not individually
liable for debts and obligations of the partnership arising from errors,
omissions, negligence, incompetence, or malfeasance committed in the
course of the partnership business by another partner or a representa-
tive of the partnership not working under the supervision or direction of
the first partner at the time the errors, omissions, negligence, incompe-
tence, or malfeasance occurred, unless the first partner.
(a) was directly involved in the specific activity in which the errors,
omissions, negligence, incompetence, or malfeasance were committed by
the other partner or representative; or
(b) had notice or knowledge of the errors, omissions, negligence, in-
competence, or malfeasance by the other partner or representative at
the time of occurrence."
144. Act effective Aug. 26, 1991, ch. 901, § 85, 1991 Tex. Gen. Laws 3235 (codified at
TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 6132b §§ 45-A, 45-B and 45-C (West Supp. 1992)).
145. TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 6132b § 15(2)(West 1970 & Supp. 1992).
146. Statutes are cited in section III.C supra, note 94. See, e.g., Cone Mills Corp. v.
Hurdle, 369 F.Supp. 426,438 (N.D. Miss. 1974)(Miss. law; plaintiff may sue one of
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discussed in Part III above.147 It may also be specified by agreement
with the third party or, in some situations, by agreement among the
partners, as discussed in Part III above.148
Where one partnership is a general partner of a second partner-
ship, joint and several liability passes through so that partners of the
first partnership are jointly and severally liable for the obligations of
the first partnership which include its liability for the obligations of
the second partnership. Thus, the partners of the first partnership are
jointly and severally liable for the obligations of the second
partnership.149
The judgment in joint and several liability is against the partners
sued and served, and may be enforced against their individual prop-
erty. If the partnership is properly sued and served, the judgment is
also enforceable against partnership property. It may not be enforced
against a partner who is not sued and served.150 Service on one part-
ner is not service on other partners.'15 Applicable long arm statutes
three partners on forward cotton contracts); Foster v. Daon Corp., 713 F.2d 148
(5th Cir. 1983)(Texas law; plaintiff may sue one partner without partnership on
condominium purchase contract); Kaneco Oil & Gas, Ltd., II v. University Nat'l
Bank, 732 P.2d 247, 250 (Colo. Ct. App. 1986)(partner liable on partnership note
signed by copartner); Armstrong v. Armstrong, 714 F.Supp. 451, 453 (D. Colo.
1989)(partner liable on partnership note though he signed it as general partner
not as individual); Smith v. Wohl, 702 S.W.2d 905, 910-11 (Mo. Ct. App. 1985)(two
of six partners held liable on partnership real estate purchase contract); Rohdie v.
Washington, 641 S.W.2d 317, 320 (Tex. Ct. App. 1982)(general partner of limited
partnership liable on partnership contract although limited partner held not lia-
ble in bankruptcy).
147. See supra section III.C.
148. See supra section III.D.
149. Hall Dadeland Towers Assocs. v. Hardeman, 736 F.Supp 1422, 1436 (N.D. Tex.
1990)(Tex. law)(managing general partner of limited partnership which was sole
general partner of second limited partnership liable for second limited partner-
ship's unregistered sale of securities; judgment against all three); Head v. Henry
Tyler Construction Corp., 539 So.2d 196, 197 (Ala. 1988); Singer Housing Co. v.
Seven Lakes Joint Venture, 466 F.Supp. 369, 375-76 (D. Colo. 1979)(Colo. law;
partner in partnership which was joint venturer in joint venture liable for joint
venture's contract breach). See In re Stanfield, 6 B.R. 265, 267 (Bankr. D. Nev.
1980)(Nev. law)(general partner of limited partnership which is member of joint
venture can be sued for venture's obligation). Service of process similarly passes
through. See infra section V.C, note 184.
150. Arkoma Coal Corp. v. Alexander, 593 F.Supp. 1524, 1535-37 (W.D. Ark.
1984)(Ark. law; joint venture); Benvenuto v. Taubman, 690 F.Supp. 149, 152 (E.D.
N.Y. 1988)(N.Y. law); Clark v. Inn West, 365 S.E.2d 682, 686 (N.C. Ct. App. 1988),
rev'd on other grounds, 379 S.E.2d 23 (N.C. 1989). See Bloomfield Mechanical
Contracting, Inc. v. Occupational Safety and Health Review Comm'n, 519 F.2d
1257, 1260-61 (3d Cir. 1975)(reversing administrative order imposing safety viola-
tion penalties on joint venturer which had been dismissed from proceeding
against joint venture). The preclusive effect on a non sued partner of a judgment
for or against another partner is discussed in sections D and E of Parts IV and V.
See infra notes 199, 203-204, and accompanying text.
151. Same v. Fiesta Motel, 79 F.R.D. 567, 569-70 (E.D. Pa. 1978). See Dillard v. Mc-
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may be used for service on a partner,1 5 2 and may also provide personal
jurisdiction for that partner and, if his or her acts constitute the trans-
action of partnership business, for the other partners.153
It follows logically from joint and several liability that a judgment
against a partner may be enforced without first exhausting partner-
ship assets or showing that the partnership is insolvent, as discussed in
Part I above.' 54 This contrasts with the requirement of prior exhaus-
tion of partnership assets in joint liability.
C. Under Statutes or Procedural Rules
Where partners' liability is joint and several for any reason-by
agreement, 5 5 by U.P.A. section 15, or by other statute or procedural
rule156-nothing more is needed to permit suits against fewer than all
the partners. However, other provisions may achieve the same result
and might be urged in dispute. Common name statutes or procedural
rules often permit suit against fewer than all the partners, as ex-
plained in Part V below. In addition, statutes or rules, aimed primar-
ily at joint obligorsL57 may be worded so as to also apply to joint and
several obligors. If so, they too would reinforce the ability to sue any
one or all of the partners. 5 s Class actions against representatives of
all the partners are possible in appropriate situations.'5 9
Knight, 209 P.2d 387, 391-92, (Cal. 1949) (determination in first suit against one
defendant [without naming partnership or partners] that car operator was in
scope of employment was not res judicata against defendant's two partners later
added to the suit; partners are not in sufficient privity for that unless they control
defense of first suit).
152. Boatmen's First Nat'l Bank of Kansas City v. Bogina Petroleum Eng'rs, 794
S.W.2d 703, 704 (Mo. Ct. App. 1990).
153. Felicia, Ltd. v. Gulf American Barge, Ltd., 555 F.Supp. 801, 804-07 (N.D. Ill.
1983) (sufficient transaction of business in Illinois to provide personal jurisdiction
and minimum contacts); Boatmen's First Nat'l Bank of Kansas City v. Bogina
Petroleum Eng'rs, 794 S.W.2d 703, 704 (Mo. Ct. App. 1990)(one partner's transac-
tion of partnership business in Missouri sufficient for long arm jurisdiction over
Kansas copartner).
154. See supra section I.F.
155. See supra section HI.D.
156. See supra section HI.C.
157. See supra section 1I.C.
158. E.g., ARIz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 44-141 (1987), applied in Catalina Mortgage Co. v.
Monier, 800 P.2d 574 (Ariz. 1990); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 38-4-3 (Michie 1978), applied
in Gallegos v. Citizens Ins. Agency, 779 P.2d 99 (N.M. 1989)(partner who settled
with plaintiff not indispensable party in plaintiff's suit against copartner); NEV.
REV. STAT. § 14.060 (1991)(in suit against defendants jointly indebted on contract
where not all are served, plaintiff may proceed against defendant served unless
court otherwise directs; judgment may be entered against all defendants enforce-
able against their joint property and separate property of defendant served), ap-
plied in Diamond Nat'l Corp. v. Thunderbird Hotel, Inc., 454 P.2d 13, 14-16 (Nev.
1969).
159. E.g., FED. R. Civ. P. 23. In re American Continental Corp/Lincoln Say. and Loan
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D. Preclusive Effect of Judgments of Liability
Liability established against one partner generally does not estab-
lish liability against another partner.160 The theories are that part-
ners are not in privity with one another for res judicata or collateral
estoppel, 161 or that due process is not satisfied without notice and op-
portunity for hearing by the other partner.16 2 However, the other
partner may be bound (i.e. held liable) if he or she, though not a
party, controlled or participated significantly in the first suit.163 Some
courts allow the other partner to be sued on a judgment against the
first partner and the partnership on a showing that he or she was a
partner at the time the partnership liability was incurred.164
Nor does liability established against one partner preclude estab-
lishing liability against another partner. 6 5 The doctrine of merger
does not apply; the other partners may be sued on the merits.1 66
Secs. Litig., Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 95,704 (D. Ariz. Oct. 31, 1990) and other
cases discussed in section II.C supra, note 105.
160. Arkoma Coal Corp. v. Alexander, 593 F.Supp. 1524, 1535-37 (W.D. Ark.
1984)(Ark. law)(plaintiff previously obtained judgment against one joint ven-
turer; in later suit court declines to enter judgment against coventurers on basis
of prior judgment); Dillard v. McKnight, 209 P.2d 387 (Cal. 1949)(determination
in suit against partner that employee's accident was in scope of employment not
binding on copartners in second suit; insufficient privity between partners; due
process requires notice and opportunity for hearing before copartners can be held
liable); Emmons v. Hirschberger, 69 N.Y.S.2d 401 (Sup. Ct. 1947)(plaintiff previ-
ously obtained judgment against partnership and one partner, in later suit against
two other partners who were severed from prior suit, plaintiff not entitled to
judgment on the pleadings).
161. Dillard v. McKnight, 209 P.2d 387, 391-94 (Cal. 1949).
162. I& at 392.
163. Ik at 392-93 (dictum); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGEaTS § 39 (1982). This
result is supported by cases holding partners bound-through res judicata or col-
lateral estoppel-by a judgment against the partnership. See cases discussed in-
fra section V.D., Krofcheck v. Ensign Co., 169 Cal. Rptr. 516 (Ct. App. 1980)(Utah
law)(partner not named in suit against partnership would be collaterally es-
topped if he controlled the suit); State of New York v. Mayflower Nursing Home,
535 N.Y.S.2d 377, 379 (App. Div. 1988)(administrative determination of Medicaid
overpayments in proceeding against partnership binds partners who partici-
pated); Heavrin v. Lack Malleable Iron Co., 155 S.W. 729 (Ky. 1913)(judgment
against partnership binds partners who actually defended suit).
164. Benvenuto v. Taubman, 690 F.Supp. 149, 152 (E.D. N.Y. 1988)(N.Y. law). Related
authorities on suits after judgment against the partnership are in section V.D
infra.
165. Carter v. Forstrom, 722 P.2d 23, 25 (Or. Ct. App. 1986)(partner's confession of
judgment doesn't preclude judgment against copartner); Ablon v. King, 279 S.W.
563, 566 (Tex. Civ. App. 1926); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS
§ 60(1)(b)(i)(1982).
166. See Arkoma Coal Corp. v. Alexander, 593 F.Supp. 1524, 1535-37 (W.D. Ark.
1984)(Ark. law)(indicating that coventurers not named and served in prior suit
could be sued on the breach of contract and damage issues determined against
one joint venturer in the prior suit). The court regarded collateral estoppel as
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A partner held liable for a partnership obligation is entitled to in-
demnification from the partnership by U.P.A. section 18(b) or, in some
cases, from the copartners.167
E. Preclusive Effect of Judgments of Non-Liability
Nonliability of one partner has been held not to preclude establish-
ing liability of another partner,168 but preclusion would be a better
result where the claim is the same.169 Indeed, a respectable argument
can be made that the partners have sufficient representative authority
from one another that each of them is bound by a decision, whether of
liability or nonliability, on a claim prosecuted against any one of
them.17 0 The argument is reinforced if each partner is given notice of
the suit and opportunity to intervene. The policy against repetitive
litigation reinforces the argument. The argument is even stronger
where the aggregate view of partnership prevails.
Preclusion in suits against fewer than all partners to enforce part-
nership obligations-whether resulting in liability or nonliability-in-
volves considerations similar to those for preclusion in suits by fewer
than all partners to enforce partnership rights'71 and, as discussed in
Part V172 below, for preclusion in suits against partnerships.
V. ENFORCEMENT OF PARTNERSHIP OBLIGATIONS
AGAINST PARTNERSHIPS (IN PARTNERSHIP
NAME)
A. In General
Partnerships may not be sued in the partnership or firm name at
common law. As discussed below, most states now permit suits in the
raising due process issues and as inapplicable. Related authorities on suits after
judgment against the partnership are in sections V.D-E infra.
167. See Bank of Commerce v. DeSantis, 451 N.Y.S.2d 974, 980 (Civ. Ct. 1982)(partner
granted judgment against copartner for bank's chargeback against partner's indi-
vidual account because of copartner's wrongful overdraft of partnership bank
account).
168. Johnson v. King, 426 S.W.2d 196 (Tenn. 1968)(no privity or identity of partners);
Rohdie v. Washington, 641 S.W.2d 317 (Tex. Ct. App. 1982)(no privity of partners;
no res judicata).
169. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 60(1)(a)(1982); Minehan v. Silveria,
53 P.2d 770 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1936)(contract judgment against partners for $343
bars suit against partnership for larger amount on same claim; partnership was
named in first suit but did not answer). Cf MacAllister v. Hosley, 224 N.E.2d 416
(Mass. 1967)(judgment for defendants as individuals bars suit against defendants
as partners).
170. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 41(1)(b)(1982)(nonparty repre-
sented by authorized party is bound by judgment).
171. Bromberg, supra note 4, at 7-10.
172. See infra sections D and E of Part V.
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firm name by statute or procedural rule. The preclusive effects of
such suits are discussed below.
B. Without Statute or Procedural Rule
Where there is no procedural rule or statute to modify the common
law aggregate theory of partnership, most courts hold that a partner-
ship cannot be sued in the partnership name, just as it cannot sue in
the partnership name,173 since it lacks capacity or is not considered a
legal person.174 If that is true in a state, a federal court applying that
state's law in a diversity suit will reach the same result.17 5 Even
though a partnership is not subject to suit, its assets can be reached by
a suit against the partners, as described in Parts II-IV above.176
C. With Statute or Procedural Rule
In more than half the states, statutes or rules explicitly permit
partnerships to be sued in the firm or common name.177 The same is
173. Bromberg, supra note 4, at 27-28.
174. E.g., Day v. Avery, 548 F.2d 1018 (D.C. Cir. 1976), cert denied, 431 U.S. 908
(1977)(since partnership could not be sued under D.C. law, there was no D.C.
defendant to bar removal of diversity case to federal court); Affie, Inc. v. Nurel
Enterprises, Inc., 607 F.Supp. 220, 221-22 (D.D.C. 1984)(D.C. law;, dismissing at-
tempted suit v. partnership since not an entity; suit must be against partners with
process served on them individually); Fazzi v. Peters, 440 P.2d 242 (Cal. 1968);
Hartford Fin. Sys., Inc. v. Florida Software Services, Inc., 550 F.Supp. 1079, 1090
(D. Me. 1982)(Maine law), appeal dismissed, 712 F.2d 724 (1st Cir. 1983), citing
Macomber v Wright, 35 Me. 156,157 (1852); Tiffany Indus., Inc. v. Harbor Ins. Co.,
536 F.Supp. 432 (W.D. Mo. 1982)(Mo. law)(dismissing claim against partnership,
not an entity capable of being sued); Pate v. Martin, 681 S.W.2d 410 (Ark. Ct. App.
1985)(workers compensation award against partnership not enforceable; U.P.-A
did not make partnership an entity); Dolph v. Cortez, 446 P.2d 939, 940 n.1 (Ariz.
App. 1968)(dictum, citing a statute stating that in situations not covered by U.P.A.
the common law applies; striking partnership's name from caption of suit; part-
nership not a legal entity and not capable of being sued). Arizona has since
adopted a rule permitting partnerships to sue and be sued in the firm name; see
infra note 177. Baum v. Glen Park Properties, 660 S.W.2d 723 (Mo. Ct. App.
1983)(dictum: partnership cannot be sued in firm name; suit must be against indi-
vidual partners; absent service on them or their appearance, there is no entity
against which judgment may be entered; but partners held to have waived lack of
personal jurisdiction over them, so they, and hence the partnership, were consid-
ered before the court).
175. Tiffany Indus., Inc. v. Harbor Ins. Co., 536 F.Supp. 432, 434 (W.D. Mo. 1982)(Mo.
law). Federal suits are further discussed in Part VI below.
176. Lenkin v. Beckman, 575 A.2d 273, 276-77 (D.C. App. 1990)(lease to partnership
specified that partners would have no personal liability; landlord could sue part-
ners after dissolution for partnership property in their hands).
177. ALA. CODE § 6-7-70 (1975); Amz. R. Civ. P. 17(j); CAL. Civ. PROC. CODE. § 388
(West 1973); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-50-105 (West 1987); CONN. GEN. STAT.
ANN. § 52-112 (West 1991); DEL. CODE. ANN. tit. 10, § 3904 (1975); GA. CODE ANN.§ 14-8-15.1 (Harrison 1990); ILL. CODE CIv. PROC. § 2-411(a); HAW. REV. STAT.
§ 634-3 (1985); IND. R. TRIAL P. 17(B), 17(E); IoWA R. CIv. P. 4; KAN. STAT. ANN.
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true in federal court for enforcing substantive rights under the U.S.
Constitution or federal laws,178 as more fully discussed in Part VI be-
low. Proposed Revised U.P.A. section 307(a)(1991 draft) would sensi-
bly provide for suits in the firm name. Provisions of this kind were
added because of the injustice or diseconomy of requiring plaintiffs to
identify and sue all the partners.179 Suit in the firm name is one of the
stronger entity characteristics.
Other states provide for service of process on a partnership, from
which the ability to sue in the partnership name is inferred. 8 0 A suit
in the partnership name need not identify the partners except so far as
necessary to permit service of process. Jurisdiction over the partner-
ship requires, of course, that it be properly namedls, and served with
process. 8 2 The statutes or rules typically provide that service on a
partner is service on the partnership. 8 3 Where one partnership is a
general partner of a second partnership, service passes through so that
§ 56-344 (Supp. 1990); LA. CODE Civ. PRoc. ANN. art. 737 (West 1992); ME. REv.
STAT. ANN. tit. 31 § 160-A (West Supp. 1991); MIcH. ComP. LAWS ANN.
§ 600.2051(2)(West 1981); Miss. CODE ANN. § 13-3-55 (Supp. 1991); NEB. REV.
STAT. § 25-313 (1989); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. ch. 510 § 13 (1983)(if more than four
partners); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 38-4-5 (Michie 1978); N.Y. Crv. PRAC. L. & R. § 1025
(McKinney 1990); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-69.1 (1983); Omo REv. CODE ANN. § 2307.24
(Anderson 1991); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 1082 (West 1988); OR. R. Civ. P.
67E(1); PA. R. Cirv. P. 2128; S.D. CODIFIED LAws ANN. § 15-6-17(b)(1984); TEx. R.
Civ. P. ANN. 28 (West 1991); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 814 (1973); VA. CODE ANN.
§ 50-8.1 (Michie 1989); WYO. R. Civ. P. 17(b). These are essentially the same stat-
utes and rules permitting partnerships to sue in the firm name, cited in Brom-
berg, supra note 4, at 29 n.152, with the addition of ALA. CODE § 6-7-70 (1975); ILL.
CODE CIV. PROC. § 2-411; and PA. R Civ. P. 2128.
178. FED. P& Cirv. P. 17(b).
179. Fazzi v. Peters, 440 P.2d 242,246 (Cal. 1968)(tracing California's section from 1854
through several successive amendments).
180. X-L Liquors, Inc. v. Taylor, 111 A.2d 753, 760 (N.J. 1955).
181. Texaco, Inc. v. Wolfe, 601 S.W.2d 737, 742 (Tex. Civ. App. 1980)(suit against part-
ners without naming partnership or alleging that they were partners insufficient
for judgment against partnership).
182. See, eg., International Aerial Tramway Corp. v. Konrad Doppelmayr & Sohn, 450
P.2d 284 (Cal. 1969)(remanding to determine whether partner was served on be-
half of partnership or nonexistent corporation of same name); Touche Ross & Co.
v. Canaveral Int'l Corp., 369 So.2d 441, 442 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1979)(no jurisdic-
tion over partnership where Florida resident partners were served solely as indi-
viduals and not "as copartners of all the named members of the... partnership as
required by the... statute ..... then in force); ISO Production Mgmt. 1982 Ltd. v.
M & L Oil and Gas Exploration, Inc., 768 S.W.2d 354 (Tex. Ct. App. 1989)(citation
directed to and served on president of corporate general partner of partnership
insufficient for default judgment against partnership; citation should have been
directed to the partnership). See Speight v. Home, 133 So. 574 (Fla. 1931)(sum-
mons to A, B, and C "partners doing business as" X Co. was to A, B, and C as
individuals, not as partners, so case could not proceed against partnership).
These decisions exalt form over substance.
183. E.g., N.Y. Civ. PRAC. L. &. R. § 310 (McKinney 1990)("Personal service upon per-
sons conducting a business as a partnership may be made by personally serving
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service on a partner of the first partnership is service on both the first
and second partnerships.18 4
More general statutes or rules may authorize service on a manag-
ing agent or other person.'8 5 The validity of such service may turn on
whether the person served is reasonably likely to transmit the service
to the partnership promptly. 8 6 Applicable long arm statutes may be
used for service on the partnership, 8 7 and may also provide personal
jurisdiction of the partnership if due process minimum contacts are
satisfied.188 Service on the partnership is generally not service on any
the summons within the state upon any one of them"); Louis Benito Advertising,
Inc. v. Brown, 517 So.2d 775 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1988).
184. First Nat'l Bank of Minneapolis v. White, 420 F.Supp. 1331, 1336 (D. Minn. 1976).
Care should be taken to assure that both partnerships are identified as parties
being served. Liability similarly passes through (see supra note 149).
185. E.g., FED. R. Civ. P. 4(d)(3)(managing or general agent of partnership suable in
firm name); Western Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v. Lamson Bros. & Co., 42 F.Supp. 1007
(S.D. Iowa 1941)(Illinois partnership, but not its individual partners, validly
served on manager of Iowa office); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 48.071 (West 1969)(nonresi-
dent partnership may be served on person in charge of local business), applied in
Bay City Management, Inc. v. Henderson, 531 So.2d 1013 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1988); PA. R. Civ. P. 423(3)("the manager, clerk or other person for the time be-
ing in charge of any regular place of business or activity of the partnership"); GA.
CODE ANN. § 9-11-4(d)(2)(Harrison 1990)(nonresident partnership may be served
on agent, cashier or secretary in this state), applied in Henderson v. Cherry,
Bekaert & Holland, 932 F.2d 1410 (11th Cir. 1991)(service on non partner account-
ant in accounting partnership bearing the title of "manager," a title often used in
accounting firms for professionals below the partner level who do not have mana-
gerial functions); Eastex Poultry Co v. Benefield, 268 S.W.2d 270, 274 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1954)(service on manager of business in county where sued); VT. STAT. ANN.
tit. 12 § 814 (1973)("a managing or general agent"). But see Cooney v. East Nas-
sau Medical Group, 528 N.Y.S.2d 364 (App. Div. 1988)(service on partnership ex-
ecutive secretary insufficient; N.Y. CIv. PRAc. L. & R. § 310 (McKinney
1990)(construed to require service on partner).
186. See, e.g., Henderson v. Cherry, Bekaert & Holland, 932 F.2d 1410, 1412-13 (11th
Cir. 1991)(Ga. law).
187. Same v. Fiesta Motel, 79 F.R.D. 567, 569-70 (E.D. Pa. 1978); International Aerial
Tramway Corp. v. Konrad Doppelmayr & Sohn, 450 P.2d 284 (Cal. 1969)(re-
manded for determination whether service on general partner present in state
was properly on partnership). Farmers & Merchants Bank v. Hamilton Hotel
Partners, 702 F.Supp. 1417, 1426-28 (W.D. Ark. 1988) apparently upheld longarm
personal jurisdiction over a partnership while noting that a partnership in Ar-
kansas was an aggregate not suable as an entity. The court did not mention, but
may have been relying on, FED. R. Civ. P. 17(b) permitting suit in the partnership
name since federal securities law claims were made.
188. Oxford Mall Co. v. K & B Mississippi Corp., 737 F.Supp. 962, 964-65 (S.D. Miss.
1990)(partnership as landlord leased property in Mississippi); Farmers &
Merchants Bank v. Hamilton Hotel Partners, 702 F.Supp. 1417, 1426-28 (W.D.
Ark. 1988)(partnerships, through an agent [a broker-dealer] solicited and sold in-
terests in the partnerships, discussed further infra, note 193); Felicia Ltd. v. Gulf
American Barge, Ltd., 555 F.Supp. 801, 804-07 (N.D. Ill. 1983)(partnership made
and performed contract to buy barges in Illinois); International Aerial Tramway
Corp. v. Konrad Doppelmayr, 450 P.2d 284 (Cal. 1969); First Interstate Bank of
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individual partner who is not served.189 Defective service may be
waived, by appearance for example.190 Common name statutes are
permissive, not mandatory; suit may still be brought against the
partners. 91
The statutes or rules usually add that any one or more of the part-
ners may be sued along with the partnership192 (i.e. named as defend-
ants and served with process). There is authority (less than
unanimous) that the same acts which give personal jurisdiction over
the partnership give personal jurisdiction over the partners as well,
and satisfy minimum contacts. 93
Oregon v. Tex-Ark Farms, Ltd., 692 P.2d 678, 683-85 (Or. Ct. App. 1984); Nutri-
West v. Gibson, 764 P.2d 693, 695-96 (Wyo. 1988)(service on partner temporarily in
state gave transient jurisdiction over partner and partnership; due process [fair
play, substantial justice] satisfied though minimum contacts not required).
189. See Bay City Management, Inc. v. Henderson, 531 So.2d 1013, 1015 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1988). See also First Nat'l Bank of Minneapolis v. White, 420 F.Supp. 1331,
1336-37 (D. Minn. 1976)(rejecting, because of lack of minimum contacts, argu-
ment that service on partnership is service on nonresident partners).
190. Bay City Management, Inc. v. Henderson, 531 So.2d 1013,1016 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1988). See in~fra notes 205-06, and accompanying text.
191. Frazier v. Carlin, 591 P.2d 1348, 1350 (Colo. Ct. App. 1979); McCormick v. Ro-
mans, 198 S.E.2d 651,654 (Va. 1973). PA. R. Civ. P. 2128(a) specifies that suit may
be against the partners or the partnership.
192. Provisions of this kind were added when statutes or rules permitting suit in the
firm name were considered to preclude suit against individual partners. Fazzi v.
Peters, 440 P.2d 242, 246 (Cal. 1968).
193. Oxford Mall Co. v. K & B Mississippi Corp., 737 F.Supp. 962, 954-65 (S.D. Miss.
1990)(general partners are agents of each other as well as of the partnership);
Farmers & Merchants Bank v. Hamilton Hotel Partners, 702 F.Supp. 1417 (W.D.
Ark. 1988)(treating partnership as aggregate so that partners acted through
agent; further discussed supra note 187); Felicia Ltd. v. Gulf American Barge,
Ltd., 555 F.Supp. 801, 804-07 (N.D. Ill. 1983); First Interstate Bank of Oregon v.
Tex-Ark Farms, Ltd., 692 P.2d 678, 685-86 (Or. Ct. App. 1984)(act of partnership's
managing agent gave jurisdiction over general partner but not over limited part-
ners). See National Bank of Washington v. Mallery, 669 F.Supp. 22,26-29 (D. D.C.
1987) (long arm statute gave jurisdiction over nonresident partner because of acts
of copartners in D.C. although partnership not suable as an entity there); Hibou,
Inc. v. Ramsing, 324 A.2d 777 (Del. Super. Ct. 1974)(foreign attachment of general
partner's corporate stock under DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 3506 (1975) treated as
equivalent of service on general partner and gave jurisdiction over partnership).
Contra First Nat'l Bank of Minneapolis v. White, 420 F.Supp. 1331, 1336-37 (D.
Minn. 1976)(service on three partners who came to Minnesota to deal with loans
from plaintiff gave jurisdiction over them, over their partnership and over second
partnership of which their partnership was general partner but not over their
two copartners who lacked minimum contacts with Minnesota). See Nutri-West
v. Gibson, 764 P.2d 693,696-97 (Wyo. 1988)(service on partner temporarily in state
gave transient jurisdiction over partner and partnership but not over out of state
copartners); International Aerial Tramway Corp. v. Konrad Doppelmayr & Sohn,
69 Cal.Rptr. 890, 895 (Dist. Ct. App. 1968), vacated, International Aerial Tramway
Corp. v. Konrad Doppelmayr, 450 P.2d 284 (Cal. 1969)(foreign partners doing
business in California amenable to service through the firm; service on general
1992]
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The partnership may typically be sued without the partners.194
When it is so sued, venue is determined, not by residence of the part-
ners,195 but, depending on the applicable venue statute, by the part-
nership's principal place of business 96 or the places where it does
business. 197
In a suit against the partnership in the firm name, judgment may
be entered against the partnership and against the partners sued and
served, but not against other partners who were not sued'98 or were
not served. 19 9 Judgment may be entered against the partnership even
partner is calculated to give actual notice to unserved partners; judgment con-
fined to joint assets in California).
An individual's physical presence in a state and service while there gives juris-
diction over the individual whether or not the suit is related to activity in the
state. Minimum contacts are not required for jurisdiction based on physical pres-
ence. Burnham v. Superior Court of California, 495 U.S. 604 (1990)(divorce cases;
no majority opinion by Court).
194. Eule v. Eule Motor Sales, 170 A.2d 241 (N.J. 1961); Eastex Poultry Co v. Bene-
field, 268 S.W.2d 270, 273 (Tex. Civ. App. 1954)(dictum).
195. Don King Productions, Inc. v. Douglas, 735 F.Supp. 522, 531 n.6 (S.D. N.Y. 1990).
Contra Eastex Poultry Co v. Benefield, 268 S.W.2d 270, 274 (Tex. Civ. App. 1954).
196. Reading Metal Craft Co. v. Hopf Drive Associates, 694 F.Supp. 98,100-01 (E.D. Pa.
1988) (joint venture's residence for 28 U.S.C.A. § 1391 venue is its principal place
of business); FSI Group v. First Fed. Say. & Loan Assoc., 502 F.Supp. 356 (S.D.
N.Y. 1980)(same for limited partnership); Bensaull v. Fanwood Estates, 488
N.Y.S.2d 944 (Sup. Ct. 1984). See Haney v. Fenley, Bate, Deaton And Porter, 618
S.W.2d 541 (Tex. 1981)(partnership is entity for venue purposes).
197. Penrod Drilling Co. v. Johnson, 414 F.2d 1217 (5th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396
U.S. 1003 (1970)(seamen's suit under Jones Act, 46 U.S.C.A. § 688 (West 1975
Supp. 1991)). See Carcella v. L & L Coach Lines, Inc., 591 F.Supp. 1272, 1275-77
(D. Md. 1984)("fact-sensitive" inquiry where partnership is doing business).
198. Fazzi v. Peters, 440 P.2d 242 (Cal. 1968)(no judgment against partner served but
never named as party); Krofcheck v. Ensign Co., 169 Cal. Rptr. 516, 520-22 (Ct.
App. 1980)(Utah law)(no sister state judgment in California on Utah judgment
against limited partnership when general partner was not named or served in
Utah); Brittany Ltd. v. Brittany of Michigan, 468 So.2d 344 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1985)(foreign limited partnership served on secretary of state; judgment affirmed
against partnership but reversed as to general partner who was not named or
served, although he had notice and testified at trial); Clark v. Inn West, 365 S.E.2d
682, 686 (N.C. Ct. App. 1988)(suit against partnership without naming partners
doesn't subject partners to individual liability), rev'd on other grounds, 379 S.E.2d
23 (N.C. 1989).
199. Prado North Resources, Ltd. v. Prado North Condominium Assoc., Inc., 477 So.2d
396 (Ala. 1985)(no judgment against general partner based on judgment in an-
other state in which he had not been served); Krofcheck v. Ensign Co., 169 Cal.
Rptr. 516, 520-22 (Ct. App. 1980)(Utah law); Promotus Enters., Inc. v. Jiminez, 98
Cal. Rptr. 571 (Ct. App. 1971)(unserved partner did not know of suit and did not
authorize partnership's lawyer to represent him; copartner had authority to hire
lawyer to represent partnership but not to represent unserved partner); Brittany
Ltd. v. Brittany of Michigan, 468 So.2d 344 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1985); Foster Lum-
ber Co. v. Glad, 303 N.W.2d 815 (S.D. 1981). See supra note 150, and accompany-
ing text and infra notes 203-04.
See Martinoff v. Triboro Roofing Co., 228 N.Y.S.2d 139 (Sup. Ct. 1962)(minutes
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though partners who are sued along with it are found not liable.200
Judgment against the partnership alone is particularly important
when intrafamily or other immunity bars suit against a wrongdoing
partner.2 01
The judgment is enforceable against assets of the partnership and
assets of the individual partners sued and served.2 02 However, the
judgment is generally not enforceable against other partners203 since
they have not been accorded procedural due process (notice and op-
amended to show lawyer's appearance only for partnership and partner served,
not for unserved partner;, partner has no implied authority to appear for co-
partner, appearance for partnership is not appearance for individual partners).
But see Heavrin v. Lack Malleable Iron Co., 155 S.W. 729 (Ky. 1913), allowing
holder of tort judgment against partnership to sue partners on that judgment
when partners had been actively defending partnership; "[P]artners actually
making defense for and on behalf of the partnership, and for and on behalf of
themselves in the partnership name, will be treated as the real parties in interest
and as the real defendants, and therefore bound by the judgment." The quoted
language suggests that the partnership judgment might be enforceable directly
against the partners.
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 48.061 (West 1969) prior to its 1987 amendment prescribed
that process against a partnership could be served on any member (partner) and,
after that service, "plaintiff may proceed to judgment and execution against all
members of the partnership." The section was strictly construed in several ways:
E.g., Hayman v. Weil, 44 So. 176 (Fla. 1937)(original process must show on its face
as sued out against all members as members of a partnership; statute is in deroga-
tion of common law); Touche Ross & Co. v. Canaveral Int'l Corp., 369 So.2d 441,
442 (Fla. Dist Ct. App. 1979)(no jurisdiction where Florida resident partners were
served solely as individuals and not "as copartners of all the named members of
the ... partnership as required by the ... statute"). In 1987 § 48.061 was amended
to say that, after service on a partner, "plaintiff may proceed to judgment and
execution against that partner and the assets of the partnership." 1987 Fla. Laws.
ch. 87-405, § 3.
200. Norman Properties v. Bozeman, 557 So.2d 1265, 1269-71 (Ala. 1990).
201. Se4 e.g., Eule v. Eule Motor Sales, 170 A.2d 241 (N.J. 1961)(wife allowed to sue
husband's partnership for husband's negligence and obtain a judgment enforcea-
ble against partnership assets [presumably insurance] although she could not at
that time sue her husband); Cody v. J. A. Dodds & Sons, 110 N.W.2d 255 (Iowa
1961) (son allowed to sue father's partnership for father's negligence); Mathews v.
Wosek, 205 N.W.2d 813 (Mich. Ct. App. 1973)(passenger allowed to sue driver's
partnership although he could not sue driver since they were fellow servants. See
1 BROmERG & RIBsTEIN, supm note 1, § 1.03(c)(7) for further discussion of the
relation of partnership liability to partner immunity.
202. Louis Benito Advertising, Inc. v. Brown, 517 So.2d 775 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1988).
203. Benvenuto v. Taubman, 690 F.Supp. 149,152 (E.D. N.Y. 1988)(N.Y. law); Same v.
Fiesta Motel, 79 F.R.D. 567, 570 (E.D. Pa. 1978)(Pa. law); Pate v. Martin, 681
S.W.2d 410,414 (Ark. Ct. App. 1985); Louis Benito Advertising, Inc. v. Brown, 517
So.2d 775 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1988). See Emmons v. Hirschberger, 69 N.Y.S.2d 401
(Sup. Ct. 1947)(no judgment on pleadings for plaintiff against two partners who
were named but not served in prior suit in which plaintiff obtained judgment




portunity to contest).204 Yet there are instances of enforcement
against other partners,205 especially if they have had notice and ap-
peared and participated in the action against the partnership.206
There are instances noted below, sometimes hard to distinguish in the
reported opinions, when a later suit against partners is permitted on
the prior judgment against the partnership or on the partnership debt
created by the judgment. There also are rulings that an arbitration
award against a partnership can be confirmed by judgment against the
partners as well as the partnership even though the partners were not
parties to the arbitration. 207
Proposed Revised U.P.A. § 307(c) would specify that a partner's as-
sets cannot be reached unless there is a judgment against the partner,
and that a judgment against the partnership is not by itself a judgment
against the partner.208 This would require the partner to be sued and
served and subjected to judgment.
D. Preclusive Effect of Judgments of Liability
Some states permit a later suit, on the prior judgment against the
partnership (or on the partnership debt created by it), against a part-
ner who was not named in the prior judgment.209 "To hold otherwise
204. Detrio v. United States, 264 F.2d 658 (5th Cir. 1959); Duncan, Inc. v. Head, 519
So.2d 1305, 1308 (Ala. 1988).
205. Cookson v. Durivage, 572 A.2d 897, 899-900 (Vt. 1990)(attachment and execution
against person on showing that she was a partner).
206. State of New York v. Mayflower Nursing Home, 535 N.Y.S.2d 377, 379 (App. Div.
1988)(administrative determination of Medicaid overpayments to partnership;
partners bound); Heavrin v. Lack Malleable Iron Co., 155 S.W. 729 (Ky. 1913),
supra note 199. See Dillard v. McKnight, 209 P.2d 387, 392-93 (Cal. 1949)(dictum:
nonparty who controls litigation is bound).
207. Carlyle Joint Venture v. H. B. Zachry Co., 802 S.W.2d 814 (Tex. Ct. App.
1990) (award is liability of partnership for which partners are jointly and severally
liable; summary judgment against partners; joint venture treated as partnership).
In Texas, partner liability is joint and several for all partnership obligations. See
Keller Constr. Co. v. Kashani, 269 Cal. Rptr. 259 (Ct. App. 1990)(general partner
bound by limited partnership's arbitration agreement with third party; award
against general partner confirmed although he did not participate in arbitration);
Gilbert Switzer & Assocs. v. National Housing Partnership, Ltd., 641 F.Supp. 150,
154-57 (D. Conn. 1986)(Conn. law; summary judgment against partner in favor of
arbitration claimant for unpaid portion of arbitration award against partnership;
partner did not participate in arbitration). Cf. Rubin, P.C. v. A. C. Kluger & Co.,
383 N.Y.S.2d 828, 830 (Civ. Ct. 1976)(dictum indicating that partners might have
been held jointly and severally liable for an arbitration award against the part-
nership that was probably based on contract between two securities dealers).
208. REV. UNIF. PARTNERsHip AcT § 307(c) Discussion Draft 1992.
209. ILL. CODE Civ. PRoc. § 2-411(b)(West 1991)(unsatisfied judgment against partner-
ship does not bar action to enforce any partner's individual liability); NEB. REv.
STAT. § 25-316 (1987)(holder of unsatisfied judgment against partnership may file
bill in equity against partners and have decree for the debt and execution against
the partners), applied in Security State Bank v. Gugelman, 230 Neb. 842, 434
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would insulate partners from their joint liability for a partnership
debt."210 Other states do not permit a suit on the prior judgment but
permit a suit on the merits,21n or on a showing that the non-named
partner controlled the prior litigation.2 12 Some states permit a later
suit but do not clarify its nature.21 3 The earlier doctrine of merger (of
the cause of action in the prior judgment), which would not permit a
later suit at all, has been largely abandoned.2 i 4 These divergent re-
.sults may depend on whether the state, or the court in the particular
case, considers the partners to be in privity21s or not to be in privity2 i6
with the partnership for res judicata or collateral estoppel purposes.
Efficiency grounds support privity and res judicata or collateral estop-
pel against a partner who is sued on a judgment against the partner-
ship.217 Parallel issues in suits against fewer than all the partners are
N.W.2d 290 (1989); Heavrin v. Lack Malleable Iron Co., 155 S.W. 729 (Ky. 1913);
Koppers Co. v. Mackie Roofing and Sheet Metal Works, 544 So.2d 25 (La. Ct. App.
1989); Brunsoman v. Seltz, 414 N.W.2d 547 (Minn. Ct. App. 1987); Adamson v.
Brady, 182 P.2d 748 (Okla. 1947)(mining partnership). Related authorities on suits
after judgment against a different partner are in section IV.D supra.
210. Dayco Corp. v. Fred T. Roberts & Co., 472 A.2d 780, 784 (Conn. 1984).
211. Duncan, Inc. v. Head, 519 So.2d 1305, 1307-08 (Ala. 1988); PA. R. Civ. P.
2134(a)(judgment against partnership does not bar later suit "upon the same
cause of action against any partner who was not individually named as a defend-
ant" in the partnership suit). Related authorities on suits after judgment against a
different partner are in section IV.D supra.
212. Krofcheck v. Ensign Co., 169 Cal. Rptr. 516, 522-23 (Ct. App. 1980)(non named
partner would be collaterally estopped from denying partnership liability and
damages). See Dillard v. McKnight, 209 P.2d 387 (1949)(recognizing principle that
nonparty who controls a suit is bound by its determination as if a party, but find-
ing it inapplicable); Brunsoman v. Seltz, 414 N.W.2d 547, 550 (Minn. Ct. App.
1987).
213. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 110 § 2-411(b)(Smith-Hurd 1983)(unsatisfied judgment
against partnership doesn't bar action to enforce partner's individual liability).
214. Brunsoman v. Seltz, 414 N.W.2d 547, 551 (Minn. Ct. App. 1987)(modern doctrine
of merger bars later suit against same defendant but allows suit against a differ-
ent defendant). See also Glen M. Gottlieb, Note, Res Judicata and Collateral Es-
toppel in the Law ofPartnership, 65 CALIF. L. REv. 863, 864-70 (1977).
215. See Krofcheck v. Ensign Co., 169 Cal. Rptr. 516 (Ct. App. 1980), supra note 212;
Brunsoman v. Seltz, 414 N.W.2d 547, 550 (Minn. Ct. App. 1987)(general partner's
control over limited partnership's affairs and participation in suit against it
[though he was not a party] supported finding of privity for purpose of collateral
estoppel justifying a judgment against him in second suit based on the judgment
against the partnership). See also Bromberg, supra note 4, at 7-10.
216. Dillard v. McKnight, 209 P.2d 387, (Cal. 1949)(partner's liability not res judicata
of copartner's liability-, no privity; no due process without suing and serving co-
partners); Martinoff v. Triboro Roofing Co., 228 N.Y.S.2d 139 (Sup. Ct. 1962)(part-
ner has no implied authority to appear for copartner;, appearance for partnership
is not appearance for individual partners; implication: no privity). Cf Johnson v.
King, 426 S.W.2d 196 (Tenn. 1968) (jury verdict for one partner not res judicata for
copartner in tort case where joint and several liability destroys privity).
217. Gottlieb, supra note 214, at 877-85, (arguing that a partner's due process require-
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discussed in Part IV.218 As noted above, in some states, a judgment
against a partner cannot be enforced against individual assets unless
the partnership assets are exhausted or the partnership is insolvent.
E. Preclusive Effect of Judgments of Non-Liability
A judgment in favor of the partnership should preclude, on effi-
ciency and fairness grounds, a later suit against the partners on the
same claim.219 Parallel issues in suits against fewer than all the part-
ners are discussed in Part IV.220
VI. ENFORCEMENT OF PARTNERSHIP OBLIGATIONS IN
FEDERAL COURT
A. In General
The limited jurisdiction of federal courts makes them differ in
some important respects from state courts in enforcing partnership
claims and obligations. Specifically, there are differences within the
federal court system, depending on whether the claim is based on a
federal question, or on some other question that invokes diversity ju-
risdiction. In either case: (1) Partners may sue or be sued in essen-
tially the same way as in state courts; (2) Service of process may be
made under the relatively liberal federal rules,22 1 or under rules of
the forum state adopted by the federal rules; 22 2 (3) Judgment may be
taken against the parties sued and served, and judgment may be en-
forced, in essentially the same ways as in state courts. The main differ-
ence lies in whether partnerships may sue or be sued and how their
citizenship is measured if that is the basis of jurisdiction.
B. Federal Question Cases
A partnership may sue or be sued in federal court "in its common
name for the purpose of enforcing for or against it a substantive right
existing under the Constitution or laws of the United States."223 This
entity treatment of the partnership recognizes the importance of a
uniform rule for "federal question" cases involving partnerships, and
ments of notice, opportunity to be heard and adequacy of representation will usu-
ally be present when a partnership is sued).
218. See supra section IV.D.
219. Gottlieb, supra note 214, at 872-75.
220. See supra section IV.E.
221. FED. R. Civ. P. 4.
222. FED. R. Civ. P. 4(c)(2)(C)(i). See, e.g., Henderson v. Cherry, Bekaert & Holland,
932 F.2d 1410 (11th Cir. 1991) (accounting partnership sufficiently served by ser-
vice on non partner accountant bearing the title of "manager;" "manager" and
"principal" are titles often used in accounting firms for professionals below the
partner level who do not have managerial functions).
223. FED. R. Civ. P. 17(b). Jurisdiction of these cases is granted by 28 U.S.C. § 1331.
[Vol. 71:143
PARTNERSHIP OBLIGATIONS
reflects the practical reality of partnerships as entities in the business
world and the efficiency of enforcing claims directly by or against
partnerships rather than through some or all of the partners. This
entity treatment is particularly significant in overriding the state laws
which adhere to the aggregate theory and do not allow partnerships to
sue224 or be sued225 in their firm name.
Among the many federal questions on which partnerships may sue
or (probably more importantly) be sued are those in: securities;226 an-
titrust;2 2 7 racketeering;2 28 patent;229 trademark;23 0 copyright;2 3 ' civil
rights and discrimination; 232 and perhaps arbitration.23 3 In all federal
question cases process may be served on a partnership by serving "an
officer, a managing or general agent, or... any other agent authorized
by appointment or by law to receive service of process ... ."234 Since a
general partner is normally a "managing or general agent,"235 service
on him or her is service on the partnership within the quoted rule.236
Additionally, some or all partners can join or be joined with the part-
224. See Serpa v. Jolly King Restaurants, Inc., 62 F.R.D. 626, 631-35 (S.D. Cal.
1974)(partners may, in partnership name, sue copartner on federal antitrust
claim although they could not do so under California law).
225. See Feldberg v. O'Connell, 338 F.Supp. 744, 746 (D. Mass. 1972)(accounting part-
nership may be sued in firm name on federal securities law claim although not
suable under Massachusetts law).
226. E.g., Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78111 (1988); Randle v.
Spectran, 129 F.R.D. 386, 389 (D. Mass. 1988) Caliber Partners, Ltd., v. Affeld, 583
F.Supp. 1308, 1313 (N.D. M11. 1984).
227. 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 1; Serpa v. Jolly King Restaurants, Inc., 62 F.R.D. 626, 632 (S.D.
Calif. 1974).
228. E.g., 18 U.S.C. § 1961-1968 (1988).
229. 35 U.S.C. §§ 1-376 (1988).
230. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1115-1127 (1988).
231. 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-119 (1988).
232. E.g., Civil Rights Act of 1964, tit. VII (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000e-17
(1988); Hishon v. King & Spalding, 467 U.S. 69 (1984); Price Waterhouse v. Hop-
kins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989), on remand, Hopkins v. Price Waterhouse, 920 F.2d 967
(D.C. Cir. 1990); Ezold v. Wolf, Block, Schorr & Soils-Cohen, 751 F.Supp. 1175
(E.D. Pa. 1990).
233. Rule 17(b) has been construed to let a partnership sue to enforce an arbitration
agreement involving otherwise nonfederal issues on the theory that the enforce-
ability of an arbitration agreement is a substantive federal right by virtue of the
Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-15. 0 & Y Landmark Assoc. of Virginia v.
Nordheimer, 725 F.Supp. 578 (D. D.C. 1989). Contra, Mesa Operating Ltd. Part-
nership v. Louisiana Intrastate Gas Corp., 797 F.2d 238, 240 (5th Cir. 1986); In re
Arbitration Between Quick & Reilly, Inc. v. Saglio, 717 F.Supp. 822, 824 (S.D. Fla.
1989).
234. FED. R. Civ. P. 4(d)(3).
235. This is by virtue of a general partner's status as "an agent of the partnership for
the purpose of its business" with power to bind the firm and the right to partici-
pate in management. UNiF. PARTNERSHIP Acr §§ 9(1), 18(e), 6 U.L.A. 1, 132, 213
(1969).
236. Porter v. Hardin, 164 F.2d 401 (5th Cir. 1947).
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nership as plaintiffs or defendants. 237
In some instances, federal statutes offer other advantages over
state law, such as broader venue,23 8 or nationwide service of pro-
cess.23 9 Federal courts have discretion to exercise pendent jurisdiction
of state law claims arising out of the same nucleus of operative facts on
which a federal claim is based.24 0 Whether partnerships may sue or be
sued in the firm name on the pendent claims is determined by state
law, however.241
C. Diversity Cases
With exceptions not relevant here, federal courts have jurisdiction
of non-federal question cases only if they involve diversity of citizen-
ship between plaintiffs and defendants and amounts in controversy of
more than $50,000.242 In these diversity cases, the capacity of partner-
ships to sue or be sued is determined by the law of the state in which
the court sits.24 s Thus, a partnership cannot be sued in its firm name
in federal court in a state where it cannot be so sued in state court.244
Conversely, a partnership can be sued in its firm name in federal court
in a state where it can be so sued in state court.245 Thus, for capacity
to sue or be sued in diversity cases, federal courts mirror the varying
state perceptions of the nature of partnerships.
Diversity must be complete: no plaintiff may have the same citizen-
ship as any defendant.2 6 Early decisions applied the prevailing aggre-
gate theory to hold that unincorporated organizations were only
237. FED. R. Civ. P. 20.
238. E.g., Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 27, 15 U.S.C. § 78aa (1988)(where any act
constituting violation occurred, where defendant is found, where defendant in-
habits or where defendant transacts business).
239. Id
240. See, e.g., United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715 (1966).
241. Caliber Partners, Ltd., v. Affeld, 583 F.Supp. 1308, 1313-14 (N.D. Ill. 1984)(limited
partnerships have capacity to sue on federal securities claims but not on pendent
state law claims for which Illinois law controls); Randle v. Spectran, 129 F.R.D.
386, 389 (D. Mass. 1988)(similar, Massachusetts law).
242. 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (1988).
243. FED. R. Civ. P. 17(b). See, e.g., Decker Coal Co., v. Commonwealth Edison Co.,
714 P.2d 155 (Mont. 1986)(construing local law on a certified question from the
U.S. 9th Circuit); Caliber Partners, Ltd., v. Affeld, 583 F.Supp. 1308,1313-14 (N.D.
Ill. 1984); Randle v. Spectran, 129 F.R.D. 386, 389 (D. Mass. 1988).
244. Tiffany Indus., Inc. v. Harbor Ins. Co., 536 F.Supp. 432, 434 (W.D. Mo. 1982)(Mo.
law).
245. Taormina Corp. v. Escobedo, 254 F.2d 171, 173-74 (5th Cir. 1958)(Tex. law), cert
denied, 358 U.S. 827 (1958).
246. Strawbridge v. Curtiss, 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 267 (1806). This and later rulings con-
strue the diversity statutes culminating in the present 28 U.S.C. § 1332, not the
potentially broader language of U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1 ("The judicial Power




collections of individuals, and that the citizenship of each individual
had to be considered, whether or not the individuals were parties to
the suit. Thus, an unincorporated joint stock company whose mem-
bers were personally liable for company debts lacked diversity if any
of its shareholder members had common citizenship with a party on
the other side.247 This aggregate or total membership diversity test
was extended to a limited partnership association even though it had
authority, by state law to sue in its own name and possessed other
corporate-like features.2 4 From this point, federal courts, in deter-
mining citizenship for diversity purposes, drifted away from state law
models and established independent federal tests. The aggregate or
total membership test was confirmed for a labor union.24 9 A fortiori
the test applied to general partnerships.250 In contrast, a corporation
had separate citizenship (e.g., at its place of organization or principal
office251) and its shareholders were disregarded for diversity purposes.
Limited partnerships grew in number after the adoption of the
1916 Uniform Limited Partnership Act by many states. They grew
further in number and in size and complexity as their federal income
tax advantages increased and became more widely apparent, and they
were sold by securities broker-dealers as passive investments. Many
limited partnerships resembled corporations in their concentrated
management power in general partners, and in the passive role of
their numerous investors with limited liability.
Analytically, there are three ways a limited partnership might be
considered for diversity purposes: (1) An entity, with citizenship de-
termined by its state of organization, similar to a corporation; (2) An
aggregate with citizenship determined by its managers (i.e. its general
247. Chapman v. Barney, 129 U.S. 677, 682 (1889)(plaintiff New York joint stock com-
pany-"a mere partnership'--failed to show that all its members had citizenship
diverse from Illinois defendant).
248. Great Southern Fire Proof Hotel Co. v. Jones, 177 U.S. 449 (1900). The plaintiff
association was formed under an 1874 Pennsylvania statute generally providing
limited liability for all members. The Court ruled that the suit could be main-
tained only on repleading the citizenship of all the members and a showing that
they were diverse from all the defendants.
249. United Steelworkers v. P.H. Bouligny, Inc., 382 U.S. 145 (1965).
250. Consumers Sav. Bank v. Touche Ross & Co., 613 F.Supp. 249 (D. Mass. 1985). See
Great Southern Fire Proof Hotel Co. v. Jones, 177 U.S. 449,455 (1900)(relying on
Chapman v. Barney, 129 U.S. 677 (1889) which described the joint stock company
"a mere partnership." The Court required repleading of the citizenship of all
members of the defendant partnerships which apparently were general partner-
ships); Labarre Plantation Partnership v. Amoco Prod. Co., 651 F.Supp. 271 (M.D.
La. 1986) (no diversity of Louisiana plaintiff partnership with two Illinois partners
in suit against corporation with Illinois principal place of business, even though
Louisiana partnership is an entity by state law).
251. A corporation is "deemed to be a citizen of any State by which it has been incor-
porated and of the State where it has its principal place of business" with an
exception for liability insurers. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(c)(1).
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partners); (3) An aggregate with citizenship determined by all of its
general and limited partners (the aggregate or total membership test).
Occasionally, courts have adopted concept (1) and measured citi-
zenship by the partnership's state of organization. 52 A few courts ap-
plied concept (2), ruling that limited partners should not be
considered in determining diversity because U.L.P.A. section 26
prescribes that a limited partner "is not a proper party to proceedings
by or against a partnership, except where the object is to enforce a
limited partner's right against or liability to the partnership. 253 This
left diversity to be measured by the citizenship of the general partners
(concept (2)) rather than the state of organization of the limited part-
nership (concept (1)).254 A few courts applied concept (2) on the alter-
nate theory that the general partners are the only real parties to the
controversy because of their decisional authority and their individual
liability for partnership obligations. 255 One court effectively carried
concept (2) still further by upholding jurisdiction of a suit against the
class of partners of a large general partnership measured only by the
citizenship of the defendant class representative rather than by all the
general partners.256
The majority of courts disagreed, applied concept (3) and required
consideration of all the limited partners257 even in cases where the
large number of limited partners bore close resemblance to corpora-
252. Namco, Inc. v. Davidson, 725 F.Supp 1148, 1153-57 (D. Kan. 1989).
253. UNIF. LTD. PARTNERSHIP AcT § 26,6 U.L.A. 561, 614 (1969). E.g., Colonial Realty
Corp. v. Bache & Co., 358 F.2d2 178, 183-84 (2d Cir. 1966), cert denied, 385 U.S.
817 (1966)(Delaware-Pennsylvania corporation v. New York limited partnership).
See Robert J. Kopecky, Comment, Limited Partnerships and Federal Diversity
Jurisdiction, 45 U. CHI. L. REv. 384 (1978). The REVIsED UNIFORM LIMITED PART-
NERSHIP AcT has no section like U.L.P.A. § 26.
254. Colonial Realty Corp. v. Bache & Co., 358 F.2d 178,184 (2d Cir. 1966), cert denied,
385 U.S. 817 (1966). Plaintiff pleaded state of organization as citizenship; the
court held this inadequate without saying why.
255. Mesa Operating Ltd. Partnership v. Louisiana Intrastate Gas Corp., 797 F.2d 238,
240-43 (5th Cir. 1986)(partnership as plaintiff); Wroblewski v. Brucher, 550
F.Supp. 742 (W.D. Okla. 1982)(partnership as defendant). The Mesa court relied
on similar reasoning sustaining diversity jurisdiction in a suit by eight trustees of
a Massachusetts business trust (whose beneficial shareholders included Texas
residents) against a Texas corporation. The trustees' broad powers made them
the real parties to the controversy. Navarro Savings Assoc. v. Lee, 446 U.S. 458
(1980). Navarro is the Court's only decision employing a functional analysis of an
unincorporated organization for diversity purposes.
256. National Bank of Washington v. Mallery, 669 F.Supp. 22, 24-26 (D. D.C.
1987)(D.C. corporation v. Maryland general partner as representative of class
which included D.C. partners).
257. E.g., SHR Ltd. Partnership v. Braun, 888 F.2d 455, 456-59 (6th Cir. 1989)(West
Virginia limited partnerships with Michigan limited partners v. Michigan defend-
ants); Elston Inv. Ltd. v. David Altman Leasing Corp., 731 F.2d 436, 438-39 (7th
Cir. 1984)(Illinois limited partnership with two Illinois individual limited part-
ners and one Delaware corporate limited partner v. Delaware corporation).
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tions and made diversity a virtual impossibility.258 These courts typi-
cally expressed preference for a bright line rule treating all non
corporate organizations as aggregates.2 9
In 1990 in Carden v. Arkoma Assocs., a sharply divided Supreme
Court, in sharply worded opinions addressed the conflict. The major-
ity resolved it in favor of concept (3) by counting all the limited part-
ners: "diversity jurisdiction... depends on the citizenship of 'all the
members.' 260 Speaking through Justice Scalia, the majority thus ap-
plied Court precedents for other unincorporated organizations 26' to
limited partnerships. In so doing, the Court held that a limited part-
nership, unlike a corporation, has no separate entity citizenship for
diversity purposes (rejecting concept (1)), and that its citizenship, as
an aggregate, is not defined merely by the citizenship of its general
partners (rejecting concept (2)). The four dissenters, speaking
through Justice O'Connor, did not address the separate citizenship of a
limited partnership (concept (1)). Rather, they argued that diversity
should be measured by the general partners (concept (2)) as the only
real parties to the controversy, (ie. those with control of the litigation
and its subject).262 For the dissenters, the limited partners are not
proper parties by virtue of U.L.P.A. section 26, the agreement's stan-
dard prohibition on their taking part in control, and the general part-
ner's exclusive controI by statute and agreement.
Carden may well have been influenced by the Court's lack of en-
thusiasm for diversity cases and its concern about heavy federal dock-
ets. Carden's context is narrow: citizenship for diversity jurisdiction
in federal court. However, it is inconsistent with the preponderant
entity character of general partnerships, and the even stronger entity
character of limited partnerships.
The Carden majority conceded that its holdings "can validly be
characterized as technical, precedent-bound, and unresponsive to pol-
icy considerations raised by the changing realities of business organi-
258. E.g., Carlsberg Resources Corp. v. Cambria Say. & Loan Assoc., 554 F.2d 1254 (3d
Cir. 1977)(2-1 decision; California limited partnership with 1500 limited partners
(including 38 Pennsylvania residents) v. Pennsylvania defendants). Cf. Consum-
ers Sav. Bank v. Touche Ross & Co., 613 F.Supp. 249 (D. Mass. 1985)(Massachu-
setts corporations v. New York general partnership with over 200 members, a few
of whom were Massachusetts residents; 18 non Massachusetts residents composed
its board of directors).
259. Stouffer Corp. v. Breckenridge, 859 F.2d 75, 76-77 (8th Cir. 1988)(2-1 decision;
Ohio corporation as general partner of limited partnership with Missouri limited
partners v. Missouri citizen).
260. Carden v. Arkoma Assocs., 494 U.S. 185, 195 (1990)(quoting Chapman v. Barney,
129 U.S. 677, 682 (1899))(5-4)(Arizona limited partnership with a Louisiana lim-
ited partner v. Louisiana citizens).
261. See supra notes 247-49.
262. Carden v. Arkoma Assocs., 494 U.S. 185, 198-209 (1990)(O'Connor J. dissenting).
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zation." 263 But the majority asserted that response should be by
legislation-"the people's elected representatives"-rather than by ju-
dicial interpretation of "citizen." 264 Carden leaves the law on partner-
ship diversity cases with the strange combination of a federal test of
citizenship, and a state test of capacity to sue or be sued.
There is at least one situation, that may survive Carden, in which
the citizenship of all partners is not considered for diversity purposes.
In a class action,265 only the citizenship of the class representatives is
considered.266
VII. ENFORCEMENT OF PARTNERSHIP OBLIGATIONS-A
CRITIQUE
A. In General
The law on enforcement of partnership obligations is, like the law
on enforcement of partnership rights,267 needlessly complicated and
inconsistent. It is similarly inefficient, costly, and wasteful of the time
and energy of parties and judges. It tends to favor partners and part-
nerships over nonpartner claimants against them, in much the same
way that the law on enforcement of partnership rights tends to favor
nonpartners over partner and partnership claimants against them. To
the extent the law favors partners and partnerships, it may encourage
risk taking by them and discourage it by their claimants or creditors.
There is no general reason to favor partners and partnerships over
263. Id. at 196. The majority's failure to make a functional analysis of the limited
partnership for diversity purposes contrasts with its willingness to make a func-
tional analysis of other non corporate organizations for taxation purposes. See,
e.g., Morrissey v. Commissioner, 296 U.S. 344 (1935)(business trust had sufficient
corporate characteristics to be taxed as corporation).
264. Carden v. Arkoma Assocs., 494 U.S. 185, 197 (1990)(O'Connor J. dissenting).
265. FED. R. Civ. P. 23 and 23.2. Rule 23.2 applies to actions by or against "members of
an unincorporated association as a class" and requires only that the representa-
tives "will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the association and its
members." The more general Rule 23 applies to classes of all sorts, but contains
additional requirements that include numerosity, common questions and their
predominance, and superiority of class treatment over alternative methods. All
the additional requirements except numerosity can be met in many partnership
cases, so that either rule can be employed. Where partners are not numerous,
Rule 23.2 can be satisfied while Rule 23 cannot. However, there is authority that
Rule 23.2 cannot be used against an unincorporated association if it has local law
capacity to be sued (and, by implication, that it cannot be used by an association if
it has local law capacity to sue). Northbrook Excess and Surplus Ins. Co. v. Medi-
cal Malpractice Joint Underwriting Assoc., 900 F.2d 476, 478-79 (1st Cir. 1990).
266. National Bank of Washington v. Mallery, 669 F.Supp. 22, 24-26 (D. D.C. 1987). See
Snyder v. Harris, 394 U.S. 332, 340 (1969); Supreme Tribe of Ben-Hur v. Cauble,
255 U.S. 356 (1921). The Carden dissenters twice noted the continued availability
of diversity class actions based on citizenship of the class representatives. Carden
v. Arkoma Assocs., 494 U.S. 185, 200, 206-07 (1990)(O'Connor J. dissenting).
267. Bromberg, supra note 4.
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nonpartners dealing with them, or vice versa. Accordingly, balanced
measures that will reduce complexity in claims between parties will
reduce transaction costs and increase the efficiency of claim resolution
with a net advantage for business and society. This Part indicates
methods by which the law of enforcing partnership obligations can be
made more efficient, consistent, and less complicated by legislatures,
courts, litigators, and drafters of partnership agreements. Similar
methods to make the law of enforcing partnership rights more effi-
cient and consistent and less complicated are considered elsewhere.2 68
B. Legislatures
Enforcement of partnership obligations has been greatly simplified
in two respects in some states: (1) by common name statutes or proce-
dural rules which permit a partnership to be sued in the partnership
name along with none, some, or all of the partners, as discussed in
Part V above; and (2) by statutes or procedural rules which make part-
ner liability for all obligations, including contract and tort, joint and
several.269 Proposed Revised U.P.A. section 307(a) would embrace
part of the first of these simplifications by stating that "A partnership
may sue and be sued in the partnership name."2 70 Proposed Revised
U.P.A. section 306 would embrace the second of these simplifications
by stating that "All partners are liable jointly and severally for all
debts and obligations of the partnership... unless otherwise agreed by
the claimant or provided by law."271 The two sections together would
embrace the remainder of the first of these simplifications by allowing
none, some, or all the partners to be sued along with the partnership.
These, or similar statutes (or procedural rules), should be adopted by
states that do not already have them.2 72
Legislatures can increase efficiency and clarity and reduce confu-
sion by specifying whether partnership assets do or do not need to be
exhausted before partners' individual assets can be applied to satisfy
partnership debts. Proposed Revised U.P.A. section 307(c) would
largely achieve this by requiring an unsatisfied judgment against the
partnership unless the partnership is in Chapter 11 bankruptcy reor-
ganization, the claimant (third party) and the partner have agreed
that exhaustion is not necessary, or the court finds that partnership
assets in the state are insufficient, that exhaustion is excessively bur-
268. Id. at 31-35.
269. See supra section II.C.
270. REv. UNIF. PARTNERSHIP Acr § 306 (Discussion Draft 1992).
271. REV. UNiF. PARTNERsEm AcT § 306 (Discussion Draft 1992).
272. These provisions tend to increase the partnership's ability to obtain credit and to
lower its cost. But they also tend to discourage persons from becoming partners,
to discourage taking risks in the conduct of the partnership business and to re-
duce partners' monitoring of each other.
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densome or that the court's inherent equitable powers are appropri-
ately exercised to permit direct recovery against individual assets. As
noted above,273 it is doubtful that there is an economic justification for
the exhaustion rule. The rule is even harder to justify in tort cases
where there is rarely a way for parties to contract around it. If legisla-
tures adopt an exhaustion requirement like Proposed Revised U.P.A.
section 307(c), they should make it inapplicable to torts, or clarify in
the legislative history that the exceptions in the section are intended
to allow a court to dispense with the exhaustion rule in tort cases.
Legislatures that have not already done so can further simplify and
clarify by specifying that service on a partner is sufficient for judg-
ment against that partner and the partnership, and that a judgment on
the merits against the partnership permits a summary proceeding to
obtain a judgment against a partner not previously served. In such a
proceeding, a partner's defenses would be limited to payment, release
or similar individual matters, and, if applicable, failure to exhaust
partnership assets. Conversely, a judgment on the merits for the part-
nership should preclude a claim against a partner.
C. Courts: General Principles
For their part, courts could simplify the law somewhat by focusing
less on abstract concepts and more on practical operational issues re-
flected in these general principles:
(1) Recognize the commercial reality of the partnership as an en-
tity in many, perhaps most, instances.
(2) Assure that all partners are aware of enforcement actions and
given an opportunity to participate in them.
(3) Require that objections to enforcement against the partnership,
or against fewer than all the partners, be made early in the pleading
stage of a trial. If sustained, the result should be no more severe than
dismissal with leave to amend or without prejudice. Early objections,
if sustained, may permit joinder of the requisite partners or avoid the
running of limitations. Late objections should be overruled or treated
as waived.
(4) Recognize the entity character of partnerships and the substan-
tial "partner authority"274 of each partner to defend a suit against the
partnership.
(5) Enter judgments only against parties named and served, but,
(6) Recognize the privity of partner and partnership and apply res
judicata or collateral estoppel (i) to preclude a partner from contesting
individual liability for a partnership obligation once the partnership's
273. See supra section I.D.




liability has been established (in a suit either against the partnership
or against another partner), and (ii) to preclude a claimant from pur-
suing liability of a partner once partnership nonliability has been es-
tablished (in a suit either against the partnership or against another
partner).275
D. Litigators
Claimants or their counsel, seeking to enforce partnership obliga-
tions, should, of course, ascertain the forum's applicable law on who
can or must be sued and served. If all partners must be parties, they
should be so named. Claimants will ordinarily want to sue the part-
nership, and all the partners, in order to obtain the broadest possible
judgment and access to assets.
Defendants should raise their objections early (e.g., by motion to
dismiss or similar pleading), or at the latest, at the time of their an-
swer. And they should make sure that all the partners are aware of
the suit so they will have an opportunity to participate in it.
E. Drafters
There is relatively little a partnership agreement can do to deal
with the enforcement of partnership obligations. The partnership can
clarify which partners have authority to defend or settle suits against
the partnership. It can require that all partners be given notice of
suits attempting to enforce partnership obligations, whether against
the partnership or against individual partners. And, it can deal with
related matters such as partnership indemnification of partners sued
on partnership obligations, partnership payment of defense costs, con-
tribution rights of partners, and the maintenance of insurance.
In agreements with third parties, the partnership may specify
whether, or to what extent, partners have individual liability and, if
there is liability, whether it is joint, joint and several, or otherwise
limited, and whether partnership assets must be exhausted before in-
dividual partners' assets may be reached.2 76
275. Recognizing vertical privity between partner and partnership does not require
recognizing horizontal privity between partners. Horizontal privity would indi-
cate that liability of a sued partner (when partnership liability has not been estab-
lished) determines liability of an unsued partner. Even if liability of a sued
partner collaterally estops the partnership from contesting liability (as horizontal
privity implies), the latter partner should have a hearing on at least his or her
individual defenses. See supra section VII.B (discussing recommendation for leg-
islative authorization of a summary proceeding for this purpose if partnership
liability has been established).
276. Supra section III.D (noting the possibility of less formal agreements limiting
liability).
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